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ABSTRACT 
This essay offers a close analysis and critique of the complex theoretical arguments in 
John McDowell’s 1984 paper, Wittgenstein on Following a Rule, a seminal discussion of 
rule-following, normativity and objectivity that still stands in need of a thorough, clear 
analysis on its own terms. My aim is to clarify and assess the arguments McDowell 
makes against the views expressed by Crispin Wright in Wittgenstein on the 
Foundations of Mathematics and Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private 
Language. I also offer analysis of relevant parts of these works as necessary. All three 
texts juxtapose attempts to expound the views of the historical Wittgenstein with 
attempts to argue for them on his behalf, but the philosophical issues under debate are 
entirely separated from that interpretive context in my discussion as they merit 
analysis in their own right. For simplicity I treat the views each commentator 
attributes to Wittgenstein as if they were the commentator’s own. 
Chapter 1 outlines and analyses the basic premises, terminology and some central 
arguments of the debate, focusing on analysis of the idea that understanding the 
meaning of an expression involves a kind of contract. Chapter 2 focuses on Wright’s 
account of the ‘contract’ picture and McDowell’s attempts to criticise it. In chapter 3 I 
analyse a notion of understanding that McDowell wants to reject, and which he 
believes is the source of Kripke’s celebrated ‘sceptical paradox’. The beginning of 
chapter 4 brings together all the lessons learned in WFR about rule-following, 
normativity and objectivity in order to suggest requirements on a plausible alternative 
contractual account of meaning and understanding.  In §4.3 I sketch an account that 
McDowell might want to adopt, and in §4.4 I test it out on the problems identified. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this essay is to present a close analysis and critique of the complex 
theoretical arguments in John McDowell’s 1984 paper, Wittgenstein on Following a 
Rule (referred to as ‘WFR’ hereafter)1, a seminal discussion of rule-following, 
normativity and objectivity that still stands in need of a thorough, clear analysis on its 
own terms. My aim is to clarify and assess the arguments McDowell makes against the 
views expressed by Crispin Wright in Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics 
(referred to as ‘W’) and Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language 
(labelled ‘K’).  
The interest of WFR, for the present purposes, is that McDowell seems to pave the way 
there for an account of rule-following, normativity and objectivity in opposition to 
those offered by Wright and Kripke. The content of this account is far from explicit, 
however, so my aim is to examine those few clear commitments that McDowell does 
make and the assumptions underlying his criticisms of Wright and Kripke. After due 
consideration and analysis of the various issues McDowell confronts in the paper, I will 
offer a sketch of a positive account I call ‘meaning-perspectivism’ that is essentially an 
interpretation of McDowell’s commitments. 
WFR is extraordinary in its attempts to fight battles on several fronts simultaneously. 
First, it aims to show that McDowell’s reading of the later Wittgenstein’s reflections on 
rule-following (in the Philosophical Investigations and elsewhere) is correct, and a 
superior interpretation to those proposed by Wright and Kripke. Second, McDowell 
aims to show that an anti-realist conception of language and meaning is disastrous, 
both by attack on the programme of anti-realism itself and by exposing the supposed 
consequences of taking it seriously. Third, he aims to preserve an account of objectivity 
in the face of problems perceived in the readings Wright and Kripke present. Finally, 
McDowell aims to give some measure of positive explanation of how meaning relates 
normatively to understanding. 
Here I will only analyse McDowell’s approach to the last three of these four tasks, 
treating WFR as a piece of philosophical theory that embodies claims about rule-
following, normativity and objectivity. The fact that the claims are argued on 
Wittgenstein’s behalf is of no philosophical importance, and I will make almost no 
                                                             
1  In Synthese 58, no. 3, pp.325-363. It has been reprinted in several collections, including 
McDowell’s Mind, Value and Reality (London: Harvard UP, 2002) where it appears with minor 
cosmetic revisions, but I refer to the pagination of the original 1984 print as I presume the 
reader will be able to access an electronic copy of it on the publisher’s website. 
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mention of the McDowell’s project of interpreting and defending his work, nor of 
Wright and Kripke’s efforts to do the same. To this effect, claims and arguments I 
attribute to these three may all be claims and arguments they in turn attribute to 
Wittgenstein. The quality of such claims and arguments clearly does not depend on 
who endorses them. 
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1 CONTRACTUAL UNDERSTANDING 
1.1 THE MINIMAL CONTRACTUAL PICTURE 
‘Wittgenstein on Following a Rule’ opens with the introduction of a supposedly intuitive 
idea about the relation between meaning and understanding, called the ‘contractual 
picture’, expressly held to be intuitively appealing by both McDowell and Wright. The 
minimal form of the contractual picture amounts to something like the following:  
Minimal Contractual Picture Understanding the meaning of an 
expression imposes some kind of 
constraints on one’s future actions, 
amounting to a commitment to make 
only a certain kind of use of the 
expression. 2 
We should note that McDowell’s own formulation involves not only understanding of 
expressions, but ‘grasp of concepts’ (WFR 325). I have opted to restrict my analysis to 
the expression case for clarity, as it is unclear precisely what McDowell thinks the 
relationship between concepts and expressions amounts to.3 Only a few of his 
conclusions pertain specifically to concepts, and restricting our analysis of the minimal 
contractual picture (and its more complex variants later on) to an examination of how 
it applies to expressions will not prevent us from understanding them, as it seems to 
apply to concepts in exactly the same way. 
It should be noted at the outset that the discussion presented in WFR takes place in the 
heyday of the thesis that ‘meaning is normative’, broad acceptance of which I will call 
‘normativism’. The idea comes from Kripke’s claim that “the relation of meaning and 
intention to future action is normative, not descriptive” (K, p.37). That some form of this 
idea was accepted by all parties is clearly the basis of the supposedly intuitive appeal 
of the contractual picture. However, recent discussions of the meaning-normativity 
thesis have raised doubts about its truth, so a call has been made for its justification. 
Answering this call is not my project here. The aim is to see what we can learn within 
the framework of this particular debate, given the shared assumptions common to the 
                                                             
2 This is a combination of McDowell and Wright’s slightly differing formulations of the 
contractual picture. Cf. WFR 325 & Wright 1980a (hereafter labelled ‘W’), p.19. 
3 For example, he talks about ‘deploying’ concepts without explaining what counts as a 
deployment (cf. WFR 326). We could speculate, but it would be unnecessary. 
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parties who were engaged in it. The most basic assumption is something like the 
following: 
Normativity of Meaning A condition for the meaningfulness of an 
expression is that some uses of it are 
correct and that the correct uses of it are 
normatively prescribed. 
The fact that there are correct and incorrect ways of using the expression is taken to 
entail that there are certain ways it should be used, thus introducing normative 
impositions and prescriptions. Note that in the formulation offered here, anyone who 
uses the expression is subject to the normative imposition to use it correctly whether 
they understand it or not. We might prefer a weaker thesis that the prescriptions in 
question only apply to those who understand the expression, but pending motivations 
for this we should opt for the stronger thesis—misunderstanding the meaning of an 
expression does not obviously detract from the correctness or incorrectness of your 
efforts to use it. The fact that correctness attaches to certain uses of the expression is 
enough to introduce some kind of universal prescription, for anyone who uses it, to use 
it correctly. Still, we might want to insist that in order to count as using an expression 
one has to have some minimal comprehension of what one is doing—perhaps we 
should not count animals mimicking the sound patterns of human speech as using 
expressions at all. 
The contractual picture is supposed to grow from the general idea that meaning is 
normative because the latter involves the conception of correctness as action-guiding. 
Understanding an expression seems to involve some degree of knowledge of situations 
when it would be correct to use the expression, hence knowledge of how the 
expression should be used, and I suppose the idea is that knowing what one should do 
amounts to acknowledging  that one should do it and allowing one’s actions to be 
guided accordingly. In order to count as understanding the meaning of an expression, 
one needs to take on the relevant commitment to correct use of it. Provided we explain 
what the ‘commitment’ in the contractual picture amounts to, my understanding an 
expression could thus feasibly entail my making a commitment only to use that 
expression in a certain range of ways.  
On the other hand, it is certainly a mistake to assume that the normativity of meaning 
has the minimal contractual picture as an immediate consequence, as the idea of 
committing to a range of usage is just one kind of normativism. McDowell and Wright 
both apparently accept it as an ‘intuitive’ consequence, though Kripke’s silence on the 
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matter leaves it possible that McDowell’s criticisms of him are off-target, despite not 
being directly reliant on acceptance of this ‘intuition’. This issue will not have much 
impact on our concerns, as it turns out. 
The envisaged constraints on action, the content of this commitment, seem to 
correspond to whether it would be correct or incorrect to apply the expression, such 
that if S understands the meaning of E then S’s use of E is constrained by a commitment 
S undertakes as a condition of understanding the meaning of E. However, this is not 
just a commitment to use E correctly at the time when S acquires an understanding of 
E, which would not be action-guiding so much as definitional. If S understands E at t iff 
S uses E correctly at t, then S does not have time to ‘commit’ to anything before the 
action takes place. S’s actions are not ‘guided’ by his understanding in this case, 
because his understanding consists in the fact that his actions are a certain way 
already. Rather, the commitment S undertakes is a commitment regarding his 
subsequent usage of E, and his understanding of E is not identical with this 
commitment. The minimal contractual picture thus seems to involve the following 
idea: 
(C) S understands the meaning of E → S undertakes to use E only 
in a range of ways R whenever S uses E. 
So when S acquires an understanding of E, S becomes subject to the prescription that 
he constrain all his use of E subsequent to the point of acquisition to a range of correct 
uses of E. However, C risks being over-strong unless further elaborated because the 
‘undertaking’ here does not obviously allow for S’s making occasional mistakes amidst 
his otherwise correct usage of E, which is something we clearly need to account for. I 
will return to questions about fallibility in §1.3. 
It should also be noted that the minimal contractual picture merely proposes a 
necessary condition on understanding the meaning of E; undertaking a commitment of 
the kind represented by C is necessary but not sufficient for having an understanding 
of the meaning of E. Having an understanding plausibly amounts to more than making 
a particular kind of commitment and may involve other elements like mental states, 
knowledge of certain propositions and so on. What else ‘having an understanding’ 
amounts to is a further question, which we will return to in §4.3. 
We need to understand precisely what the commitments in question amount to. 
McDowell claims that the intuitive contractual picture entails that if we fail to honour 
our commitments, we fail “to obey the dictates of the meaning we have grasped” (WFR 
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325). This seems to mean that someone who fails in this way ceases to understand 
what he understood before, but then we need to know what that amounts to in 
practice. An alternative interpretation of this might be much stronger, such that the 
understanding of E we ascribe to S would turn out to have been misplaced if S 
subsequently failed to honour the commitment to restrict his usage to range R. On this 
conception, if S does not uphold the commitments required of him by an 
understanding of the meaning of E then S never did understand E after all. 
It seems unlikely that the stronger conception is what McDowell has in mind, because 
the arrangement described is not recognisable as something we would call a 
commitment, and the discussion here is focused on the specific component of S’s 
understanding of E that is constituted by S’s commitment to restrict his usage to range 
R. When a commitment is broken by failing to honour it, it is not retrospectively 
unmade, but rather ceases to apply after a period when it did apply: if S commits at t to 
doing A at t′, it does not follow that if S does not do A at t′, S did not commit at t to 
doing A at t′. Rather, a commitment is like a property that attaches to S and remains 
attached to S for as long as S does the right things, i.e. upholds the commitment—
similar to how promises function. 
 A corollary of the minimal contractual picture seems to be that if no commitments are 
made to use an expression correctly, then no constraints on usage are in place, and one 
does not have an understanding of the expression in question. Similarly, if the wrong 
constraints are in place and S undertakes to use E in the wrong range of ways, then the 
understanding that sanctioned those constraints is ‘faulty’. This might be called a 
‘misunderstanding’, but to avoid suggesting that it fails to be any kind of understanding 
I will stick to the term ‘faulty understanding’. This is because the minimal contractual 
picture seems to allow that S could attempt to learn the meaning of E, but come to 
acquire an understanding not of E but some similar expression E* used in a nearly 
identical way. Here it would be fair to say that S has an understanding not of E but of 
E*. However, S’s intention was to learn the meaning of E, so there is an important sense 
in which S has an understanding of E, but one which is faulty. The need for this 
becomes apparent if we allow that E* could be a new expression of S’s own invention, 
which corresponds to E except in cases where S would use E incorrectly, which would 
be correct uses of E*—in such cases, we would be more inclined to focus on S’s 
commitment as it relates to E than to the new invented expression E*, to rule out the 
idea that every mistake in understanding is a proper understanding of something else. 
I will accordingly leave the option of calling this a ‘faulty understanding of E’ open. I 
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will refer to the case where someone’s understanding of an expression is not faulty in 
this way, so where the constraints their understanding imposes on their use of it 
correspond to the range of correct uses, as a case of ‘proper’ understanding. 
1.2 REALISM & OBJECTIVITY 
The possibility of faulty understanding—the possibility that the constraints on use 
imposed by an individual’s understanding of an expression may not reflect the range of 
correct ways of using it—involves some notion of objectivity with respect to 
correctness. As such, objectivity is a central theme in WFR. The question of how the 
correctness of a particular use of an expression is determined is important here, as 
finding this out will, it seems, provide us with an idea of how an understanding comes 
to qualify as proper rather than faulty. Is correctness a property assigned to actions by 
groups of people, or is it a property that attaches to them by virtue of some thinker-
independent features of reality—and if neither of these, then what?  
It might be tempting to think that language is a human creation, and that the facts 
about how to use it correctly are therefore up to humans. But this idea entails counter-
intuitive consequences: if the correctness of a claim about mathematical truth depends 
ultimately upon human decisions about the circumstances under which such claims 
can be made, then it might seem to follow that the truth of a mathematical claim is a 
product of constructed language practices and not, as we often think, anything to do 
with facts about the universe as it exists independently of us. The problem does not go 
away if we decide that the claim is correct because it is true, because whether it is 
correct to say the claim is true falls to us as well…and so on. Motivated by this kind of 
worry, McDowell argues that allowing the reduction of all notions of objective 
correctness to something like ‘communal assent’ on correctness results in the 
eradication of any intuitive notion of objectivity.4 If statements of all kinds rely only on 
human attitudes to be correct, then the correctness of claims about the external 
world—their truth—seems to owe no allegiance to facts about the world as it exists 
independent of our reckoning. However, the fact that language is created by humans 
does not entail that the facts about how to use it are merely a matter of consensus 
unless further assumptions are adopted. Further motivation for entertaining this idea 
is required. 
                                                             
4 What a ‘reduction’ amounts to must be analysed: see §2.2. 
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McDowell’s principle antagonist in WFR is Crispin Wright, who argues that we should 
dispense with ‘realist’ notions like mind-independent objectivity and objective 
standards on which the correctness of an application of a particular expression 
depends. Wright accordingly sets out to make revisionary ‘anti-realist’ claims about 
objectivity, particularly in mathematics, though the aim is apparently not to make 
revisions which are totally unpalatable. 
The motivation for this call to revise our notion of objective correctness seems to draw 
on the following kind of reasoning. Whenever we agree that our most refined criteria 
for determining the correctness of some application of an expression are satisfied, the 
most we can know is that we agree that they are satisfied, not that they are satisfied in 
some way independent of our judgment that they are. For the assertion ‘snow is white’, 
we accept that it is correct just in case we agree that our most stringent criteria for the 
correctness of the statement ‘snow is white’ have been satisfied. If we all sincerely 
judge that some application is correct, then a fact of its correctness independent of that 
sincere communal judgement of correctness plays no role—for in such cases, if we 
sincerely judge that the application is correct relative to such facts then by definition it 
will not make a difference whether that is really true because no-one could tell. Since 
the most we can offer is our most sincere judgments about such facts of correctness, 
with no way of knowing that any judgment reflects such facts, it seems that such facts 
themselves play no correctness-determining role in our language practices. 
The notion of objectivity attacked here is one we might describe as ‘transcendent’, 
which means that even our even the judgments we hold in the highest regard may still 
be false. It is a ‘realist’ notion, in that it takes facts to depend on reality and not on 
thinkers. Based on these ideas, Wright thinks that ‘realism’ entails the following thesis: 
Logical Independence (LI) For particular true statements it is either 
unnecessary or insufficient, or both, to 
meet our most refined criteria of 
acceptability in order to be true. (W, 
p.199) 
However, there is reason to doubt that many realists would accept this condition, and 
hence to reject the particular form of argument above as an argument against realism 
in general. The problem lies in the expression ‘most refined criteria of acceptability,’ 
which is slightly odd. It seems plausible that for any statement, our most refined 
criteria for its acceptability would demand the truth of that statement. So unless we 
grant that there is a distinction to be made between our notion of truth, as applied in 
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the case of statements of the form ‘P is true’, and some other kind of superior, 
transcendent ‘truth proper’, the offered thesis is rendered incoherent: meeting our 
most refined criteria of acceptability means being true. But if we acknowledged this 
distinction, surely we would add truth of the transcendent kind to our most refined 
criteria of acceptability! The realist’s failing to demand this would seem like a 
concession to external world sceptics that we cannot know the real facts. If ‘most 
refined criteria of acceptability’ does not include things like truth, then it is mysterious 
why not. 
Indeed, McDowell expressly rejects the following view, ‘Problematic Realism’: 
Problematic Realism A genuine fact must be a matter of the way 
things are in themselves, utterly independently 
of us. So a genuinely true judgment must be, at 
least potentially, an exercise of pure thought; if 
human nature is necessarily implicated in the 
very formulation of the judgment, that precludes 
our thinking of the corresponding fact as 
properly independent of us, and hence as a 
proper fact at all. (WFR 351) 
At first glance this might not seem so bad. It does not intuitively seem that worldly 
objects depend on us for their existence, and if facts are just configurations of such 
objects then the truth of judgments about such facts seems determined by the objects, 
and not by virtue of the way they relate to humans. However, this gloss is not quite 
what ‘Problematic Realism’ amounts to. The idea is rather that the facts and objects in 
question are totally alien to us, and that our status as human beings inhabiting the 
same world as them must be separable from our ability to make true judgments about 
them, if those judgments are to be true. This is what McDowell means by ‘human 
nature’ in opposition to ‘pure thought’. The perspective adopted by human beings as a 
consequence of their interactions with the world is taken by Problematic Realism to be 
a bias that prevents them from getting to the truth. However, realism does not need to 
adopt this view. A realist could accept that human beings have a certain mode of 
existence and still make true judgments which are not merely true ‘as far as we can 
tell’. This is the line I read McDowell as taking in WFR, and it explains his opposition to 
both ‘Problematic Realism’ and ‘anti-realism’. 
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1.3 DETERMINACY 
The commitments described in the contractual picture are supposed to have 
determinate consequences for future language use, so we need to understand what 
kind of determinacy is at stake.5 It apparently involves facts about whether any 
application of an expression to a particular situation would be correct, which I shall 
sometimes call the ‘correctness-value’ of the application.6 For McDowell (as I read 
him), statements about whether a particular application of an expression would be 
correct are timelessly true or false. This is part of what the relevant notion of 
determinacy amounts to, and I will formulate it as follows: 
(M1) For any possible application a of an expression E, a is either 
correct or incorrect.7 
How does M1 relate to a particular understanding of E on the contractual picture? ‘C’ 
(from §1.1) seems to explain how commitments are supposed to relate to 
understanding here, so we can tie correctness into the picture of commitments by 
adapting ‘C’ to produce the following account of ‘proper’ understanding: 
(M2) S’s understanding of the meaning of E is proper ↔ S undertakes 
to apply E only in a range of ways R, where R is the range of 
correct ways of applying E. 
M2 leaves it open whether S needs to know the contents of range R, and so whether the 
undertaking in question is a conscious commitment to certain things or something 
more tacit (as in most people’s commitment to avoid shoplifting), but I suspect it 
makes better sense as something tacit and will assume so when referring back to M2.  
If we accept M1 and M2 together, we have a version of the contractual picture where 
every possible application of an expression E has a determinate correctness-value, and 
where a ‘proper’ understanding of E means committing to applying E only in the 
correct ways. M3 below gives a corresponding definition of ‘faulty’ understanding: 
 
                                                             
5 Cf. WFR 325 (quoted above, §1.1). 
6 I will use expressions of the form ‘the correctness value of x’ in a non-substantive way to 
replace those of the form ‘whether x is correct or incorrect’, simply for convenience. Anything 
that can be correct or incorrect thus has a correctness-value, just as anything that can be true or 
false has a truth-value, before we make any claims about what the notions of correctness and 
truth amount to. 
7 Questions of vagueness may arise here, but they can be safely suspended as their relevance is 
minimal. 
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(M3) S’s understanding of the meaning of E is faulty ↔ S undertakes 
to apply E only in a range of ways R*, where R* is not the range 
of correct ways of applying E. 
Accepting M1-3 seems to give us a realist contractual picture. This is because, by M1, 
range R is a range of applications with determinate truth values. Replacing M1 with a 
different principle will eventually allow us (§1.4) to produce an anti-realist contractual 
picture. 
A word on fallibility is appropriate at this point. We may be forgiven for finding the 
normative claims about understanding puzzling, since it is perfectly consistent for 
someone to understand an expression properly and then go on to use it incorrectly 
sometimes; errors in performing additions are not necessarily symptomatic of a 
misunderstanding of addition, even if it is the case that one ought not to make errors. 
But if it is possible to make mistakes without stepping outside of the constraints the 
contractual picture says are imposed by a proper understanding, then those 
constraints must pertain to something other than our ability to err in this way.  
The kind of constraint in question does not ensure the individual’s adherence to it, but 
it does ensure that actions of a certain kind, those that fail to adhere, will qualify as 
incorrect—and this amounts to a negative prescription, such that the individuals 
should not do it. But M2 does not seem to specify whether occasionally failing to act 
within range R entails breaking one’s commitment, though it does seem to say that 
breaking one’s commitment entails ceasing to understand the use of E.  Based on 
considerations so far, the following might seem apt: 
(M4) S undertakes to apply E only in a range of ways R → S can 
accidentally apply E in a way falling outside R. 
This says that as long as the incorrect application is a result of an accident, perhaps a 
cognitive slip of some kind, S can be said to maintain his undertaking (commitment) so 
this alone does not negate his understanding of the meaning of E. This allows us to 
reconcile ordinary fallibility with the notion of determinate commitments with respect 
to future action. However, M4 leaves us no specification of the difference between an 
‘accident’ and a momentary switch to a faulty understanding, both of which could be 
indicated by the same incorrect application. We need to add that what makes 
something an ‘accident’ is a failure to uphold the commitment, and not a total break or 
alteration of the commitment. 
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On the contractual picture, a mistake of the kind where someone with a proper (non-
faulty) understanding of addition answers “5” to the question “What is 68+57?” is a 
mistake in two respects: a) by virtue of its failure to use the expression “5” within the 
range of ways specified by that individual’s understanding, and b) by virtue of its being 
objectively incorrect to use the expression “5” in this way.8 The distinction is important 
because the range specified by an understanding may not coincide with the range of 
objectively correct ways to use the expression, as described by the M3 account of faulty 
understanding. Only if the understanding is ‘proper’ will the two ranges coincide, as 
per M2. 
Accordingly, it is possible for S to uphold the commitment made as a condition of his 
acquiring and understanding of the meaning of E, and apply it ‘correctly relative to his 
understanding’—that is, in a way from among the range of ways specified as correct by 
S’s understanding—but simultaneously apply it incorrectly in objective terms. If S has 
a faulty understanding of the meaning of E, then S may apply E correctly on most 
occasions but apparently have a ‘blind spot’ for a particular range of situations, 
consistently applying E to them when it is incorrect to do so. Assuming S upholds the 
commitments required by his understanding, the explanation for the ‘blind spot’ is that 
on S’s faulty understanding of the meaning of E, his systematic errors are not errors 
but possible applications of E that fall within the range R* but not, it turns out, within 
the range R (see M2 and M3 above). The converse would apply if S upheld his 
commitment but consistently treated certain correct applications of E as incorrect. S’s 
commitment is upheld, so S does what his understanding prescribes, but not what is 
objectively correct, so objectively prescribed. This is the difference between ‘relative 
correctness’ and ‘objective correctness’. The word ‘correct’ as it appears in M2-4 means 
‘objectively correct’, although for reasons that will become apparent9, we should allow 
that in M1 it means both objectively (in)correct and (in)correct relative to any given 
understanding. Thus M1 should be revised as follows : 
(M1) For any possible application a of an expression E, a is either 
objectively correct or objectively incorrect, and for any 
understanding of the meaning of E, a is either correct or 
incorrect relative to that understanding. 
 Hopefully this distinction makes it apparent that properness in M2 can be understood 
in terms of a perfect overlap between relative and objective correctness, such that the 
                                                             
8 What ‘objective incorrectness’ amounts to will depend on whether we adopt M1 or some 
alternative principle. 
9 Cf. §2.1. 
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range R of objectively correct ways of using E is precisely the range of usage that S’s 
understanding prescribes for S. M3 makes it possible for someone to have an 
understanding of the meaning of E such that correctness relative to that understanding 
does not entail objecitve correctness, but what if S makes an objectively correct 
application of E that is incorrect relative to his understanding? This would not mean 
that S properly understands E, because in this case S is not committed to making this 
kind of application, and being so committed is a condition on proper understanding. 
1.4 PATTERNS OF APPLICATION 
The ‘minimal contractual picture’ seems to be well characterised by the conjunction of 
C, M2, M3 & M4, provided we can overlook the absence of any appeal to concepts from 
these theses, as I suggested we should for now (§1.1). Sadly, the picture is not 
formulated quite so explicitly in WFR. The prominent gloss is provided by a quotation 
from W: 
…we are ‘committed to certain patterns of linguistic usage by the 
meanings we attach to expressions’. (WFR 325)10   
This ‘pattern’ idea is unhelpfully metaphorical. ‘Pattern’ seems to mean an observable 
regularity in language usage, such as using E in a certain range of ways on different 
occasions, and the patterns to which we are committed are the objectively correct 
patterns of usage of the expressions whose meanings we understand, corresponding to 
the range R in M2. ‘Conforming to a pattern of application for E’ just seems to mean 
‘restricting one’s usage to a certain range of possible ways of using E’. 
The pattern metaphor arises by analogy with the practice of continuing a series in 
mathematics. If someone (properly) understands the rule that generates the series, 
then if he does try to continue it he should produce terms that do, in fact, correctly 
continue the series. McDowell reluctantly11 accepts the idea as a reasonable gloss on 
the contractual picture and adopts the terminology, apparently for the sake of better 
connecting with Wright’s explicit critique of it as an intuitive notion which is almost 
entirely wrong and in need of reinterpretation. According to McDowell, the 
reinterpretation Wright goes on to offer is unacceptable (WFR 326). 
Wright claims that “there is in our understanding of a concept no rigid, advance 
determination of what is to count as its correct application” (W, p.21), and for present 
                                                             
10 The embedded quotation is from W, p.21. 
11 Cf. WFR 359n3, also 361n41. 
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purposes we can treat this as a claim about understanding the meaning of an 
expression. This is simply a denial of M1.  Instead, Wright holds that the correctness-
value of some postulated future application is indeterminate until that application is 
actually made. This is because he claims the objective correctness-value of any 
particular application is determined by communal evaluation, and communal 
evaluations are not committed to internal consistency across time—what everyone 
thinks is correct today may easily be regarded as incorrect at some future time for no 
more reason than that our attitudes are open to change. So preserving the pattern idea 
means making sense of how one can restrict one’s applications of E to an 
indeterminate range, as whether any particular way of using E falls within R is in some 
sense indeterminate.  
McDowell’s gloss on Wright’s offering is roughly that the commitment in question is a 
commitment to using the expression in a way that achieves the approval of the 
community, a.k.a. ‘objective correctness’. I suppose the role of a personal 
understanding here would be reduced to offering some kind of inductive guidance 
about how I should use an expression. Perhaps I have enough in common with my 
peers that what I think would be correct is the same thing that the community would 
think correct. M2 & M3 thus amount to the following: a proper understanding is an 
understanding that commits S to using E in a way that tracks communal consensus, in 
the manner of a voter who always manages to vote for the winning candidate in 
elections; a faulty understanding is an understanding that commits S to using E in ways 
that mostly track communal consensus with occasional divergence. Wright might 
replace M1 with the following: 
(W1) For any application a of an expression E, a is either correct or 
incorrect ↔ a is an actual (not merely possible) application of E. 
Objective correctness-values for possible applications are indeterminate, but 
determinate for actual applications that have been made, because the matter of 
whether a future application of E is objectively correct is only determinate once the 
application has been made and the community has deemed it correct or incorrect. This 
last clause highlights the important of consideration of the case for Wright. Note that 
‘actual application’ here seems to have some impact on ‘mentions’ of the expression as 
well as ‘use’ of it: correctness-values are determinate precisely for cases of expression 
use that have been considered, even hypothetically. However, the account of 
indeterminacy of subsequent correctness applies in such cases as well, such that the 
application of an expression to a considered hypothetical context c may have a 
Rule-Following, Normativity & Objectivity 
 
19 
 
different correctness-value from the same application if it is subsequently made in the 
corresponding actual context c. The fact that we have made the determining judgment 
of correctness-value of a case prior to its arising does not mean that our judgment as it 
arises will respect the agreed correctness-value; requirements of internal consistency 
in our usage do not arise in this way.12 What all this highlights, in any case, is that 
merely possible applications, whose correctness-values are determinate according to 
M1, are unconsidered or uninvestigated applications. 
McDowell’s characterisation of Wright’s view, which I have aimed to follow here, is a 
characterisation of a counter-intuitive and revisionary view—although we need to 
trace the arguments in order to be sure that it really is Wright’s own (see Chapter 2 
below). According to McDowell, Wright’s view is totally unacceptable because it entails 
consequences that are simply too counter-intuitive, on the plausible assumption that 
there is a limit to how counter-intuitive a respectable philosophical thesis can be. 
McDowell charges Wright with ultimately failing to preserve the normativity of 
meaning, hence meaning itself. He also argues that Wright fatally undermines a 
“familiar, intuitive notion of objectivity” (WFR 325), implying that it too must be 
preserved. Indeed, Wright joins McDowell in rejecting ‘Problematic Realism’ (cf. §1.2), 
a notion of objectivity that perhaps has some prima facie appeal when it takes the form 
of ‘platonism’ in mathematics. However, McDowell’s claim is that Wright’s approach to 
rejecting Problematic Realism jeopardises a more plausible intuitive idea that should 
be preserved: 
The idea at risk is the idea of things being thus and so anyway, whether 
or not we choose to investigate the matter in question, and whatever 
the outcome of any such investigation. That idea requires the 
conception of how things could correctly be said to be anyway—
whatever, if anything, we in fact go on to say about the matter; and this 
notion of correctness can only be the notion of how the pattern of 
application that we grasp, when we come to understand the concept [or 
expression] in question, extends, independently of the actual outcome 
of any investigation, to the relevant case. (WFR 325, my brackets) 
It is one thing to deny that applications of an expression are correct by virtue of facts 
about the world as the Problematic Realist view conceives them, but it is quite another 
to deny that what determines correctness is in any way independent of the judgments 
                                                             
12 It might seem that this view requires us the rejection of any kind of causal determinism that 
would allow (in principle) the prediction of what views would be held, as this would apparently 
make objective correctness-values determinate. However, the fact that the predictions would 
need to be interpreted means this is not the case (cf. my discussion of mechanical proof-
checking in §2.1). 
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and attitudes of thinkers. The point McDowell wishes to preserve is the idea that an 
application has a correctness value independently of thinkers coming to investigate its 
correctness-value. The idea is that the world is a certain way independently of what 
people think and say about it, and accordingly that judgments about the world are 
correct or incorrect by virtue of the way the world is and not by virtue of the 
judgments and attitudes of thinkers. If ‘this cup is red’ is a correct deployment of the 
concept ‘red’ then that is because the cup is red, and not just because most speakers of 
English would agree that the cup is red.13 By contrast, Wright seems simply to identify 
the outcome of an investigation into how things are with how the community judges 
things to be at the time of investigation, such that ‘our best judgment as to how things 
are’ is just how things are. 
The final sentence of the passage just cited shows how poorly suited the pattern idea is 
to expressing the notion of objectivity McDowell wants to preserve. How does a 
pattern ‘extend independently’ in this way? The thought seems to be that there is an 
independently existing ‘potential pattern of application’ that would be the right way to 
apply E to the situations S encounters and has yet to encounter, but that sounds rather 
like something metaphysical and thinker-transcendent in line with Problematic 
Realism. 
All the idea actually amounts to is that correctness-values for all possible applications 
of an expression are determinate as per M1 (questions of vagueness aside). Thus, when 
we apply E to a new situation, the question of whether the application is correct is 
‘settled in advance’, so to speak. The pattern imagery suggests that as we encounter 
new situations we trace a course of possible relatively correct actions that was laid out 
beforehand by our understanding, which is also a course of possible objectively correct 
actions in the case where our understanding is proper.  But this is unnecessarily 
misleading: the idea is simply that relative correctness-values are assigned to all 
possible cases by an understanding, and that at least M1 and M2 are true.14 In ‘pattern’ 
language, this idea is the ‘investigation-independence’ of objectively correct patterns of 
application; what would be correct is a fact we can discover by investigation, which 
obtains independently of our doing so. A related notion is ‘ratification-independence’, 
                                                             
13 See the discussion of ‘calling something yellow’ at WFR 335, which is analysed later in the 
present paper (§2.4). 
14 I assume that someone holding M1 and M2 would also want to hold M4 to make sense of 
fallibility, and would hold M3 unless aiming to define ‘an understanding’ more strongly as 
necessarily involving the right range of commitments. I think McDowell accepts all four, simply 
because his denying M2 would make it difficult to understand his gloss on Kripke’s discussion 
of the ‘sceptical paradox’ (Cf. my chapter 3). 
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which is simply the same idea of objectivity as it relates specifically to independence 
from communal assent to a given judgment about the facts. 
1.5 SUMMARY 
McDowell writes: 
…if the notion of investigation-independent patterns of application is to 
be discarded, then so is the idea that things are, at least sometimes, 
thus and so anyway, independently of our ratifying the judgement that 
that is how they are. (WFR 325) 
His worry is that discarding this notion leads us to a kind of ‘idealism’, sacrificing the 
notion that a judgment to which everyone assents at a given time may be false. Notice 
that this is different from rejecting ‘Logical Independence’ (LI) from §1.2 above: we 
may all assent to a false judgment because we falsely believe it to be true, meaning that 
it did not in fact meet our ‘most refined criteria of acceptability’. But in rejecting both 
Problematic Realism and LI, Wright also denies that this kind of situation is possible: 
communal assent to a judgment is identified with its truth. 
Imagine we want to account for the correctness of the sincere claim that a chair is blue, 
as characterised by a certain application of the expression “this chair is blue”. 
According to the kind of objectivity in question, accounting for the correctness of that 
claim involves checking that it tallies with the way the world is—whether it reflects 
reality. In terms of relativity and objectivity, we want to know whether the application 
of the expression is objectively correct—but with the additional caveat that objective 
correctness is more than just a matter of agreement among people, and is primarily 
determined by the way the world is and how correctness-values are assigned to 
interactions with the world by a proper understanding. If this particular application is 
a correct application of the expression “this chair is blue”, then that is not just because 
it is judged to be correct by everyone who matters, but because this chair is blue. 
Intuitively, it is possible for a chair to be blue even if no-one thinks it is. This is 
ultimately what Wright must deny in replacing M1 with W1.15 
In summary, McDowell suggests that Wright offers a ‘reinterpretation’ of the pattern 
idea, which is itself a gloss on the minimal contractual picture that corresponds to the 
conjunction of principles C, M2, M3 and M4. The reinterpretation involves “discarding 
the thought that the patterns are independent of our ratification” (WFR 326). This 
                                                             
15 Note that other ‘anti-realist’ accounts of the contractual picture could be produced by 
substituting W1 for other principles. Wright’s is not the only option. 
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simply means discarding the idea that the objective correctness of a given application 
is a fact independent of communally agreed-upon judgment to that effect, which 
involves a denial of M1; the thesis that objective correctness-values for possible 
applications are determinate. Wright’s intention is to undermine Problematic Realism, 
and with good cause. But as McDowell observes, the collateral damage of his efforts is 
the unacceptable loss of the idea that universally accepted judgments and truth are 
separable. 
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2  WRIGHT’S ANTI-REALISM 
2.1 ANTI-REALISM & OBJECTIVITY 
We have seen (§1.4) that Wright wishes to reinterpret the idea that understanding 
meaning commits us to patterns of application, which is a particular gloss on the 
minimal contractual picture whose essential components are principles C, M2, M3 & 
M4. Wright denies the realist principle M1 in favour of something like W1, which 
amounts to denying determinacy of objective correctness-value to merely possible 
applications of an expression while accepting that actual applications have a 
determinate objective correctness-value. As we saw, this is neatly summarised by the 
following: 
There is in our understanding of a concept no rigid, advance 
determination of what is to count as its correct application. (W, p. 21) 
Wright is not aiming to deny that, for example, “we may programme a machine 
effectively to check any putative proof” (W, p.20)—that a conclusion can be derived 
from certain premises does not seem to be ‘up to us’, so not indeterminate in the way 
that motivated the denial of M1, despite the supposition here that a judgment about 
correctness is indeterminate in objective correctness-value until it is made. Rather, 
Wright’s concern seems to be that the interpretation of mathematical rules and 
inference rules is not mechanically determinate in this way, and that this is really what 
matters in the case of human language users. 
In principle, we could always run a program that would output the correctness-value 
of any possible application of an expression if we could specify the range R of correct 
ways of applying it. But Wright’s claim is that the range R itself is indeterminate for 
merely possible applications because objective standards may be different when they 
come to be actualised, since objective standards are flexible, human standards. So 
while in principle we can always specify a range and have something mechanically test 
whether an application falls within the range, that turns out to be irrelevant if, as 
Wright believes, we cannot guarantee that the range will apply to non-actual 
applications because we cannot guarantee that our judgments about the output of the 
machine at that time will coincide with our judgments now. If we accept this idea of 
flexibility, then it is quite possible that we will eventually interpret the machine as 
having made an error when by present standards its output would have been judged 
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veridical. In fact, Wright ultimately wants to challenge the idea of there being a fact 
about communal consistency across time. 
In line with this, for Wright it is not the case that “rules of language … determine how 
such-and-such circumstances may correctly be described” (W, p.20). If anything, it is 
our interpretation of the rules of language that would determine correctness here, and 
I suspect Wright might even want to deny any substance to the distinction here 
between ‘the rules’ and ‘our interpretation of the rules’, reducing the former to the 
latter. 
What are the arguments behind this view? As we know, McDowell sees Wright as 
aiming to undermine a strong realist notion of objectivity, something like that involved 
in Problematic Realism, but accidentally making impossible any intuitively plausible 
notion of objectivity. How does Wright characterise this target himself, though? He 
writes: 
to think …  of the shape of some unobserved object as determinate, 
irrespective of whether or not we ever inspect it, is to accept that there 
are facts about how we will, or would, assess its shape if we did so 
correctly, in accordance with the meaning of the expressions in our 
vocabulary of shapes. (W, p.216) 
On this view, square things count as square whether anyone thinks they do or not, 
because the meaning of the predicate ‘is square’ is fixed and so is the range of ways in 
which it is objectively correctly applied. Though the meaning of an expression may 
change over time, this will be met with a corresponding change in the ranges of ways it 
can be objectively correctly used. In this sense, the meaning is what determines the 
range of objectively correct applications and not the expression. 
According to Wright, 
This idea leads us to look on grasp of the meaning of a shape predicate 
as grasp of a pattern of application, conformity to which requires 
certain determinate verdicts in so far unconsidered cases. In that sense, 
the pattern extends of itself to cases which we have yet to confront. (W, 
p.216) 
This is the realist notion he hopes to undermine, although the idea of a pattern that 
‘extends of itself’ is puzzling. This image is simply meant to convey the denial of a 
particular type of determinacy, one where what we judge to be correct in the future is 
answerable to what is correct independently of that judgment—a ‘ratification-
independent’ fact of correctness. Hopefully it is plain from this that all Wright is saying 
is that M1 is false. That is noteworthy, because the realist contractual picture we get 
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from accepting C+M1-4 is apparently far weaker than the sort of ‘transcendent realism’ 
that Wright wants to target in the following passage: 
If there can be such a thing as a ratification-independent fact about 
whether an expression is used on a particular occasion in the same way 
as it has been used on previous occasions, it ought to be something 
which we can recognise—or at least be justified in claiming to obtain. 
Otherwise the correct employment of language will become on every 
occasion radically transcendent of human consciousness. (W, p.218) 
Understood as a general claim about what kind of theories we should accept, this 
presents us with an indication of the anti-realist motivation for rejecting a particular 
‘transcendent’ kind of realist objectivity. The grounds seem to be that if a fact is 
‘radically transcendent of human consciousness’ then it is not accessible to humans, so 
we might doubt that such ‘transcendent facts’ are the facts we normally deal with, 
undermining any theories that do have such notions of the facts we normally deal with. 
I suggest that this kind of realist’s contractual picture would involve adding Logical 
Independence to C + M1-4, so Wright’s intended target seems to be more than just M1. 
If he does end up rejecting every account of objectivity that accepts M1, as McDowell 
has suggested, then the charges of overkill might be entirely justified. It seems that the 
Problematic Realist’s version of the contractual picture would accept LI+C+M1-4, 
though strictly speaking we would have to add some principle that explained LI in 
terms of the rejection of human nature’s involvement in the making of a genuinely true 
judgment. Acknowledging this caveat, we can safely identify the conjunction of 
LI+C+M1-4 with Problematic Realism. 
In any case, Wright clearly needs to demonstrate that the possibility of any of our 
judgments about correctness changing over time, if indeed it is a general possibility, 
constitutes a reason to reject M1, or else provide further reasons for doing so. 
However, the ‘implosion’ objection I raise below (§§2.2 & 2.3) offers a reason to doubt 
the possibility that our judgements do change over time, particularly from Wright’s 
perspective. 
It is worth spending a little time to understand how ‘rule-following’ fits into this 
discussion. Imagine someone tries to continue the pattern ‘2, 4, 6, 8, 10’. There is an 
algebraic rule that generates this pattern, though the term ‘n+2’ that expresses this rule 
does not figure anywhere in the pattern itself. We might see a pattern emerging in the 
series but be unable to say what exactly the pattern is, or what its underlying rule is, or 
predict what the next term will be. Moreover, someone who predicts that it will be 12 
might not have done so for the correct reason—for example, if they simply guessed.  To 
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‘grasp’ this pattern is, so it seems, to be able to continue the series indefinitely with 
some degree of reliability and for the right reasons, i.e. because the rule that generates 
the series is ‘n+2’. For any n, someone who has grasped the pattern should be able to 
predict the next n in this pattern whether they have ever performed that calculation 
previously or not. Furthermore, for any n, someone who has grasped the pattern 
should be able to tell whether any number presented to them is the next n or not. He or 
she is in a position to know whether any new case ‘fits’ the pattern. It is in this sense 
that the notion of ‘grasping a pattern of application’ relates to the idea of 
‘understanding a rule’. 
A possible gloss on the ‘pattern’ version of C+M1-4 realism might be that the objective 
correctness-value of any possible application of (e.g.) the shape predicate ‘is square’ is 
determined by the rule that generates the objectively correct pattern of application for 
that predicate, in conjunction with facts about which objects are square and the 
relation between the rule and those facts. To adapt this for Problematic Realism 
(LI+C+M1-4) we would have to add that the conjunction of the rule, the facts, and the 
relation between them determines objective-correctness-values in a way that entirely 
excludes the involvement of human beings, by virtue of the experience-transcendent 
fact that certain things are rectangular and that the predicate attaches exclusively to 
those things. 
2.2 COMMUNALLY ESTABLISHED CORRECTNESS 
Wright’s reinterpretation of the pattern idea, C+W1+M2-4, is effectively characterised 
by the following passage: 
…an understanding of  may be harmlessly, if unilluminatingly, 
described as grasp of a certain general pattern of use, provided that this 
grasp is then reductively construed as the ability to participate in an 
on-going community of assent in the use of . To grasp the pattern of 
use for  which one’s training aimed to illustrate and explain is just to 
come to understand ; and the knowledge of use in which that 
understanding consists is manifested as, and so goes no further than, 
the ability to participate in the linguistic community as far as the use of 
 is concerned. It is an error to conceive … of understanding   as 
explanatory of the latter ability, to think of shared grasp of a pattern as 
underlying and issuing in our propensity for consensus in the use of .  
(W, p.227) 
A word on ‘reductive construal’ is appropriate here. Wright apparently intends for the 
‘grasp of a pattern’ in question to be conceived in a particular way. Having a ‘grasp’ of 
Rule-Following, Normativity & Objectivity 
 
27 
 
this kind is not to ‘grasp a ratification-independent pattern of use’, but rather to have 
the ability to participate in a community of assent. Apparently, the attribution of a 
‘grasp of a pattern’ is not correct unless it can be further analysed as the attribution of 
such an ability.  In this sense, ‘having a grasp’ can be reduced to ‘having a certain 
ability’—so although we can accept talk of grasping patterns, this should be taken as 
standing for some other idea.  
A rough minimalistic notion of reducibility might be that X is reducible to Y just in case 
X can be fully analysed, or perhaps fully explained, in terms of Y. In this minimal sense, 
water is reducible to H2O. However, Wright seems to be trying to say more, that 
reducibility here is important for factual accuracy. The claim seem to be that it would 
be erroneous to accept it as a fact that one grasps a pattern while denying the 
reducibility of this to one’s ability to participate to a community in question; the 
original judgment that one grasps a pattern would apparently then be false on this 
view. Call this idea ‘explanatory reducibility’. Crucially, it is also being denied that grasp 
of a pattern explains that ability, and that at most the envisioned ‘grasp’ is a complex 
description of that same ability; the two phenomena are identical. In similar terms, 
Wright might say that language practices are reducible to certain patterns of behaviour 
and psychology, in order to deny that linguistic competence explains these patterns 
rather than being identified with them. Call this an ‘explanation denial’. 
A related but distinct idea is that the reducibility of X to Y entails that the X is somehow 
‘less genuinely real’ than Y. The idea is that a greater degree of accuracy would require 
us to talk about X in terms of Y, about X as a complex of Y, or even just about Y. This 
understanding of reduction is puzzling. We seem to be moving from the analysability of 
X in terms of Y to the failure of X to genuinely exist—but it is hard to imagine many 
situations where this inference would be obviously sanctioned. It is sometimes argued 
that moral properties are less genuinely real than non-moral properties if they can be 
analysed in terms of non-moral properties, but that inference is not obviously licenced 
without further argument.16 We might say that an animation is not accurately 
described as something that moves but as a successive display of many still images, but 
this does not immediately licence the conclusion that the animation exists in some 
lesser way than the successive display of still images with which it is to be identified—
nor indeed, that it is ‘less true’ that the animation moves than that the series of images 
are displayed in succession. However, the inference from the fact that something is 
                                                             
16 For example, Blackburn (1981) argues this in defending of his ‘quasi-realism’ against 
McDowell (1981). 
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reducible to other kinds of things to its being less-than-genuinely real is a surprisingly 
common one in discussions of objectivity and mind-dependence, as revealingly 
critiqued by Gideon Rosen (1994). Call this slightly dubious kind of reduction an 
‘ontological reduction’. 
For Wright, the idea that my understanding the meaning of an expression commits me 
to a limited range of use merely tells us that I understand the meaning of an expression 
just in case I can participate in a linguistic community that accepts only certain 
applications as correct. The explanation denial says that my behaving in certain ways 
relative to the linguistic community constitutes my understanding the correct pattern 
of use, rather than being explained by it as a realist would suppose, because the 
understanding in question is reducible to an ability to participate. The normativist’s 
intuition that in understanding the meaning of an expression we share common 
normative commitments to a pattern of usage, while assumed by Wright to be true, is 
not expressed here in a way that reflects the facts of the matter. To the extent that 
commitments are involved, these amount to the fact that ceasing to use an expression 
in the same way as our peers results in the cessation of our proper understanding.  
 From what we have seen of Wright’s views on worldly features that extend beyond 
experience, it should be apparent that he reserves a certain “hostility towards any 
notion of truth for certain statements dissociated from criteria for their verification” 
(W, p.28). As part of the general anti-realist programme, his aim is to offer an 
ontological reduction of intuitively realist concepts (e.g. the existence of unverifiable 
phenomena) that cannot be ‘manifested’ in terms of things deemed to be immediately 
accessible to us, to concepts that can. The things deemed immediately accessible 
exclude objects conceptualised in a certain way, on the understanding that 
conceptualisation requires linguistic competence, and we aim to explain all linguistic 
competence eventually—so a full explanation cannot rely on that. This means that the 
basic components of meaningful activities are taken to be things like the particular 
patterns of behaviour exhibited by linguistically competent human beings, the sorts of 
thing that can be taken as ‘natural’ phenomena, having no meaning in themselves. The 
anti-realist ‘manifestation challenge’ Wright formulates (1980b, p.112) is a twofold 
condition on when we should accept characteristically ‘realist’ concepts as 
corresponding to genuinely real features of reality: 
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Manifestation Challenge 1) The realist should explain how, when our 
training is necessarily restricted to 
confrontation with experienceable situations, 
we are supposed to be able to form a 
conception of what it is for an experience-
transcendent situation to obtain. 
2) The realist should explain what evidence 
there is that we actually possess any such 
conception—what in our use of any particular 
statement would distinctively manifest that 
we understood what it was for that statement 
to be true in a manner transcending our 
capacities for verification. 
The most striking question about this, apart from what some of its more imposing 
jargon means, is why a realist should accept the challenge thus formulated. Perhaps 
surprisingly, this is not on McDowell’s agenda; as I outlined (§1.4), his approach in 
WFR is to reject anti-realism on the basis of the unappealing consequences it entails. 
Still, McDowell does go on to argue (WFR §§10-11) that the unappealing consequences 
are traceable to the notion of ‘manifestation’ at work in anti-realism, and he connects 
this to assumptions that he thinks we should reject. I return to this in Chapter 4. 
As McDowell puts it, 
…the behaviour that counts as manifesting understanding to others 
must be characterizable…without benefit of a command of the language 
in question. (WFR346) 
The challenge is supposed to be met without appealing to the realist concepts under 
examination in the explanation. Interestingly, that seems to adopt the assumption that 
those concepts do not play such an essential role in our language that we would be 
unable to characterise them in this way. In effect, it is ultimately this kind of 
assumption that McDowell targets—I return to the idea in Chapter 4. 
The anti-realist’s supposition is apparently that for a large class of realist notions, 
including M1, the manifestation challenge cannot be met. A possible application, 
understood as one which has not been considered, seems to be beyond our 
experience—apparently by virtue of the stipulation that it is ‘unconsidered’. But the 
terms here are very slippery, and it might well be that the realist can make room for 
the idea of ‘experienceable’ unconsidered cases, or account for how we ‘directly 
manifest’ a grasp of a ratification-independent fact.  I suspect that if the manifestation 
challenge is offered on the supposition that it cannot be met, it is simply because the 
realist account imagined is something like Problematic Realism. Indeed, Wright’s 
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thought that realism is characterised by LI reveals a tendency to assume that realist 
objectivity must involve verification-transcendence, which I have suggested is not 
necessarily the case. That M1 can be characterised in a way that meets this kind of 
challenge seems perfectly plausible. 
It is undoubtedly an associated requirement of verifiability for genuine facts, whatever 
‘facts’ amount to ontologically, that allows Wright to make most of the important 
claims of his argument. The requirement allows Wright to specify that if someone is 
trying to follow a ratification-independent pattern of application he will only count as 
having done so if he can justify the claim that he really has followed it. If it can be 
argued that no-one could ever provide that kind of justification, then it would follow 
that adherence to ratification-independent patterns is not possible. In our terms, the 
challenge is first and foremost to justify the realist’s claim that any given application of 
an expression E is objectively correct by virtue of the objective correctness-value 
according to M1. However, ‘ratification-independence’ is something that applies also to 
a realist notion of the range of correct ways of using E specified by any particular 
understanding, as this too reaches to merely possible applications. So there is a second 
challenge here, to show that any particular application of an expression E is correct 
relative to the determinate range of correct applications specified by a given 
understanding of the meaning of E (whether proper or faulty).17  
Wright’s argument takes the form of a reductio of the claim that following a rule for the 
use of an expression is adhering to a determinate pattern of application which ‘extends 
of itself’ to new cases. It begins with the idea that in teaching someone how to use an 
expression objectively correctly, I can give him instructions for its use which he 
initially seems to understand but to which, from my perspective, he subsequently fails 
to adhere in new cases. If his applications are correct relative to his understanding of 
the meaning of the expression, then by M3 this would be a faulty understanding. Since 
having a faulty understanding involves undertaking to restrict one’s usage to a slightly 
different range from that which is objectively correct, there seems to be a sense in 
which he would not simply have failed to follow the instructions I gave, but rather, 
have followed different instructions from those issued. Wright will ultimately aim to 
show here that the only way we know whose understanding is faulty is by referring to 
the fact that I was teaching and the student was learning, such that if we were both 
                                                             
17 In fact, this last is one way of interpreting the sceptic’s challenge in K. See §4.1 below. 
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competent users of that expression we could not know for sure whose understanding 
was faulty in a case of divergence like this.18 
Imagine the rule of application for the predicate ‘is unwell’ corresponds in a simple 
way to the semantic rule 
(G) ‘S is unwell’ ↔ S is unwell 
However, our student’s deviant rule of application corresponds to the following 
‘gerrymandered’ semantic rule, like that of Goodman’s ‘grue’ property: 19 
(G*) ‘S is unwell’ ↔ S is unwell between t and t+6 
Now clearly someone who is unwell (assuming G is true) will be identified as such by 
the student if he follows G*, but only within a certain time frame; if S is unwell after t+6 
then the predicate does not apply to S according to G*. Of course, from the instructor’s 
perspective the student’s divergence at t+6 from the instructions given will seem totally 
mysterious so long as it is assumed that they were originally understood by the 
student as amounting to something like G and not G*. 
The problem is that the student could quite conceivably justify his interpretation of the 
instructions given with an appropriate set of ‘rules for interpreting instructions’ (in a 
sense, second-order rules). 
That is, if somebody suddenly makes what seems to be a deviant 
application of the rule, there may be an interpretation of the 
instructions which we gave him which both explains his use of the 
terms in question which coincided up until now with the use which we 
intended, and also the further deviant use. (W, p.23) 
Let’s assume, for illustrative purposes, that the instructor specifies that ‘S is unwell’ 
materially implies that ‘S is not well’. Perhaps the student has similarly mislearned 
how to use the predicate ‘is not well’, so that the semantic rule his usage reflects is that 
‘S is not well’ iff S is not well between t and t+6, resulting in the error in his 
understanding of how to use ‘is unwell’.  
However, the problem could lie, as Wright imagines, with some more fundamental 
aspect of his ability to follow instructions. If the instructions can only convey their 
intended meaning under the correct interpretation, then it must be possible for the 
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19 For ‘grue’ see Goodman 1983. 
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instructor to guide his student to the correct interpretation by corrections, 
explanations, demonstrations and so on. But, we suppose, these too can only convey 
their intended or proper meaning if correctly interpreted. Unless we are willing to 
posit some level at which the interpretations of student and instructor must coincide, 
the ensuing regress leaves it up to the student simply to make whichever 
interpretation of the instructions as seems best to him, and he is likewise at liberty in 
how to understand any attempts on the part of the instructor to correct him, as no 
watertight justification for choosing one interpretation over another can be offered.20 
In the face of this possibility it is uncertain how we arrive at a common understanding 
of language. Beyond this, it is also unclear how we are able to use words consistently in 
the same way from one case to the next; any particular interpretation of the 
instructions for use of ‘is unwell’ is also subject to interpretation. Imagine that, when 
our student hears the instructor saying things like, “Only describe someone as ‘unwell’ 
if they are not feeling well,” he says to himself, “‘S is unwell’ iff S is unwell between t 
and t+6”. We might at least hope that this will result in him consistently following G* 
when he meant to follow G, but if the interpretation is just some further expression 
that supposedly conveys the meaning of the original then repeating “‘S is unwell’ iff S is 
unwell between t and t+6” like a mantra will not guarantee that the student even obeys 
the semantic rule G* on his most sincere efforts. If expressions in the language are 
always subject to interpretation in this way then something the student says to himself 
is just as prone to ambiguity as the words of his instructor. 
In the face of this difficulty we naturally appeal, Wright claims, to the idea that the 
learning process is some kind of ‘cottoning on’, “that is, a leap, an inspired guess at the 
pattern of application which the instructor is trying to get across” (W, p.216). The idea 
is that when I try to learn the use of an expression it seems ‘as if’ I form hypotheses 
about how it should subsequently be used, one of which I ultimately come to believe 
reflects a correct interpretation of the application rule employed by my instructor. The 
instructor himself cannot guarantee that I will form the correct ‘hypothesis’ rather 
than some subtly incorrect variant but, so we think, I will somehow arrive at it 
eventually.  
Wright does not mean that I actually do form a hypothesis in the common language, for 
in the end, if such a hypothesis took a linguistic form it would be subject to an 
                                                             
20 The idea of a point at which the interpretations ‘must coincide’ is what McDowell calls a 
‘super-rigid machine mythology’. See WFR §4 and also my analysis thereof (§3.2). 
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interpretive regress as before. Rather, it is merely ‘as if’ I form a hypothesis: the 
envisaged leap is “something idiolectic” (WFR 327). 
On this picture, then, “each of us knows of an idiolectic pattern of use, for which there 
is a strong presumption, when sufficient evidence has accumulated, that it is shared 
communally” (W, p.217). I myself can be certain of what I understand the rule to mean, 
so I can at least act in accordance with my own idiolectic version it on the assumption 
that it reflects the rule my instructor intended. Confident in my ability to maintain a 
pattern of relatively correct applications relative to my own idiolectic understanding, I 
eventually settle on the idea that my idiolectic understanding is a proper 
understanding; that the relative correctness of my applications entails their objective 
correctness. 
However, so the argument goes, even adhering to this kind of private pattern is 
problematic. If someone thinks to himself, “I want to call that sort of thing ,” where 
‘that sort of thing’ means an idiolectic classification of objects, then we assume that he 
imposes constraints on himself to call  only ‘that sort of thing’. The trouble is, 
whenever he sincerely attempts to apply this rule in new cases he cannot be sure that 
something which he is convinced to be of ‘that sort’ really does fall under his earlier 
specification. With respect to what we presume is a determinate pattern of application 
to which he commits himself, he apparently cannot be certain that what seems to him 
to be obviously a correct application, in accordance with that pattern, will really be 
one. He cannot appeal to anyone else to check whether he is following his idiolectic 
rule, as by its idiolectic nature he is unable to effectively communicate what he means 
by ‘that sort of thing’; it has a meaning only for him.21 
Wright later observes that “there is no scope for a distinction here between the fact of 
an application’s seeming to me to conform with the way in which I understand it and 
the fact of its really doing so” (W, p.355). It is important that we try to get clear on this 
idea. So first, imagine that I set up one of these idiolectic rules by thinking to myself “I 
want to call that sort of thing Q”. Questions of vagueness aside, this rule sorts all 
particulars into two sets: ‘that sort of thing’ and ‘not that sort of thing’. In fact, we 
should be able to derive the following semantic rule: 
(H) ∀x (‘x is Q’ ↔ x is that sort of thing) 
                                                             
21 Cf. W, pp.216-17 
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If H follows from my idiolectic rule, then for every attribution I make of the property Q 
to a particular there will be a determinate verdict as to whether that particular really is 
Q according to the dictates of my idiolectic rule. The extension of the predicate ‘is that 
sort of thing’ is firmly established by H. 
In order to reject M1 as we revised it—i.e. as also involving determinacy in relative 
correctness-value for possible applications—Wright aims to show that any 
determinate verdict generated by H is irrelevant here, on the basis that the notion of 
such a verdict can be rejected as failing the manifestation challenge. Now, the best I can 
do in applying Q to new cases is to try my hardest to be accurate in any judgment that 
some x is that sort of thing, but a consequence of the notion of ‘idiolectic classification’ 
at work here is that inaccuracy in such a case is not measurable. Here, if it seems to me 
conclusive that ‘α is that sort of thing’ then, having eliminated ex hypothesi the 
possibility of anyone other than I checking that α really is that sort of thing, the 
question of accuracy is answered entirely by whatever my most sincere judgment is on 
the matter. The actual truth value of that statement becomes an irrelevant theoretical 
artefact, having no detectable consequences of any kind for my judging practice. 
Nevertheless, since the notion of an idiolectic rule precludes any scope for a distinction 
between relative correctness and mere seeming relative correctness in its application, 
it seems plain that such a rule could not really guide someone’s actions, and would thus 
lack any normative influence. Yet it might seem that if others had access to my 
idiolectic rule and could compare my Q attributions to the class of things designated Q 
by my rule, it might bring some kind of substance to the idea of my successfully 
following the rule, and so to the idea of its being normative. For as Wright notes, 
The only circumstance in which it makes sense to think of someone as 
correctly applying a non-standard understanding of, for example, 
‘square’ is where there is a community of assent about how, given that 
that is what he means, he ought to characterise this object. (W, p.217) 
We might paraphrase this as: to say that someone has a non-standard understanding of 
‘square’ means that there is a recognised proper understanding of ‘square’ which 
differs from his. It seems to be important to Wright that whoever makes final 
assessment of my performance can draw the distinction between a sincere effort and 
success. Harking back to his assumption about the importance of a ratification-
independent fact being recognisably true, it seems that here a language community is 
able to provide a less biased standard than I could provide for myself, as what may 
seem a correct application to me may not seem so to anyone else. 
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However, if we have to appeal to communal assent in this way then we have to modify 
our conception of understanding. Rather than acting in accordance with an idiolectic 
pattern of use, properly understanding an expression then becomes acting in 
accordance with the communally agreed rule; what is objectively correct is determined 
by the community. If people can agree on how an expression should be applied in a 
new case and my own usage conflicts with this (produces relatively correct 
applications relative to my understanding which are objectively incorrect), then I have 
failed to understand the rule and so failed to adhere to the pattern respected by the 
community. 
Wright’s objection now is that, as McDowell puts it, there seems to be a “precise 
parallel between the community’s supposed grasp of the patterns that it has 
communally committed itself to and the individual’s supposed grasp of his idiolectic 
commitments” (WFR 328). Wright asks us (W, p.218) to imagine a new case where the 
community agrees that my actions do accord with the communal rule—that they are 
objectively correct, because correct relative to the communal understanding, which we 
assume to be proper. Here it seems that the same ‘privacy’ problem arises again, as 
communal assent does not tell us that my actions really did accord with that rule, only 
that the community sincerely believes that it did—the community is just as blind to 
correctness-values relativized to its understanding. 
It seems at this point that we have run out of options. If we imagine the community to 
encompass every human agent, then we have exhausted the pool of arbiters who could 
recognise any deviations from our communal understanding, and yet M1 entails that 
the whole community could still be incorrect in its judgments relative to its 
understanding; we may all agree that a new case fits the pattern, and yet be wrong, 
while having no idea that we are wrong. 
To put the point in the starkest possible way: how can we penetrate 
behind our consensus verdict about a particular decidable question to 
achieve a comparison of our verdict with the putative investigation-
independent fact? (W, p.220) 
The answer Wright gives is simply that we cannot. I suppose the argument for this is 
that if judgment is separable from the truth, and every instance of knowing the truth is 
a judgment separable from the truth, then there is always the possibility that our best 
judgments about truth are false. On the reasonable assumption that we successfully 
ascribe truth to things, there then might seem to be something wrong with the notion 
of correct judgments about truth depending on verification-transcendent facts of this 
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kind: either a) that it requires us to make an unjustifiable claim to be in line with such 
facts whenever we make true judgments, or posit some mysterious faculty of intuition 
that provides such justification, or b) that it forces us to address the sceptical 
possibility that the truth of our judgments is ultimately not knowable. I think a) is 
more of a problem here than b); the fact that this notion permits scepticism is not a 
problem unless it can also be shown that the scepticism is intractable. However, for 
Wright b) is apparently the priority, and I presume that the explanation is based on 
some methodological claim to the effect that we should prefer anti-realism because it 
prevents these issues arising. However, holding that kind of principle may prove 
dangerous for Wright if McDowell can substantiate the claim that anti-realism leaves 
no room for objectivity of a recognisable kind, for there would then be a case for 
preferring a kind of realism where objectivity is adequately accounted for. Wright’s 
argument should amount to more than this, and in effect the extra hidden premise is 
(again) that investigation-independent facts fail the manifestation challenge. 
If ratification-independent patterns cannot be what actually determine the objective 
correctness-values of our applications for the same reason, then the normativity of 
meaning cannot be explained by a commitment we undertake to accord with such 
patterns. This is where the anti-realist alternative steps in: 
What does it add to describe the situation in two-fold terms, of the fact 
of conformity to the pattern and the community’s recognition of that 
fact, rather than simply saying that there is communal agreement about 
the case? (W, p.219) 
If we fail to find a use for pre-ordained patterns to which our actions should accord, the 
anti-realist concludes that the notion is misleading and must be explained away. It is 
proposed that the contractual picture can only amount to the fact that non-normative 
and apparently contingent facts about human beings ‘commit’ us to certain patterns of 
behaviour. Understanding an expression’s meaning commits us to using it in certain 
ways in the future only in the sense that we only count as understanding it if our use 
satisfies the communal consensus, and we are driven to maintain our understanding. 
Objective correctness is denied as explaining whatever the communally accepted 
understanding dictates, being reducible to it, and whatever the communally accepted 
understanding dictates is in turn reduced to whatever the community agrees that it 
dictates. Range R (of M2-4) thus contains whatever the community agrees it contains. 
Our distinction between objective and relative correctness becomes unhelpful at this 
point, as any legitimate kind of correctness is reducible to communal consensus, being 
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denied any explanatory role: correctness relative to personal understanding is denied 
legitimacy here; correctness relative to the communal understanding is reducible to 
communal consensus on correctness; and objective correctness is also reducible to 
communal consensus on correctness. However, it is important to note that the 
reductions described here are not clearly of the dubious ontological variety. Reducing 
objectivity to communal consensus does not immediately licence the conclusion that 
objectivity is not something genuine—I presume that Wright does not intend it to, and 
his only additional commitment seems to be that objectivity does not explain the 
consensus. This will have an impact on my assessment of McDowell’s ‘Illusion 
Argument’ in the next section. 
It should now be clear what McDowell means when he describes this account as a 
‘reinterpretation’ of the contractual picture—the “allegiance to conceptual 
commitments” he thinks is an essential part of the contract intuition becomes 
‘allegiance to communal verdicts’.22 
2.3 SOME PROBLEMS FOR WRIGHT’S ANTI-REALISM 
I will take this opportunity to outline some things that McDowell finds objectionable 
about this picture. I will then try to explain some of the counter-intuitive consequences 
that seem to follow from Wright’s account, and begin to tie those consequences to the 
general line of attack McDowell offers in WFR. 
Wright’s appeal to a linguistic community is supposed to explain how we arrive at the 
idea that some applications of an expression are objectively correct or incorrect, as it 
provides some kind of authority to which each person’s usage must conform whatever 
their own judgments of correctness might be. Normativity is supposed to enter the 
picture at the level of communal authority, a consequence of the fact that if one falls 
behind the way that language usage evolves one ceases to mean what one intends with 
one’s words. Introducing the possibility of an individual’s error relative to this 
community introduces the possibility of his actions being guided, and so for the 
normativity of meaning. 
The main trouble with this picture of normativity is that it entails the falsehood of the 
intuitive claim that the objectivity of a fact means that it is not merely agreed upon by 
us, due to the operative explanation denial. But can we rightly call communal 
consensus a kind of objectivity at all? That would seem to involve totally revising 
                                                             
22 For ‘allegiance’, see WFR 327, 352. 
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everything we think about objectivity, particularly regarding the objectivity of facts 
about reality, and it seems likely that the end product would be unrecognisable. What 
about keeping the old notion but accepting the truth of the proposed analysis? So long 
as Wright presents communal agreement as the real truth behind our intuitive notion 
of objectivity it is unclear how the two ideas could both be held consistently. The view 
does not obviously make room for anything less than a complete denial of the intuitive 
notion, and the ‘objectivity’ Wright does make room for is unsatisfying because it 
excludes the possibility of our being jointly mistaken in applying an expression like 
‘That box is square’—that is, in our judgment as to its truth-value when applied to a 
particular box. 
McDowell seems to think that this is a problem for Wright in itself, and perhaps the 
view really is too counter-intuitive. However, I think Wright would just deny that 
sacrificing the intuitive kind of objectivity is a weakness. He explicitly considers the 
case of applying shape predicates with objective correctness and still comes to this 
conclusion that the relevant kind of objectivity consists in communal consensus, so is 
clearly unfazed by its impact on our intuitions about it. McDowell’s criticisms will only 
make an impact if he can show that rejecting the intuitive notion of objectivity has 
further consequences that Wright cannot accept. Indeed, he attempts to show that the 
rejection entails the non-normativity of meaning, which would be a showstopper for 
Wright if demonstrable. 
McDowell’s claim is that the normativity of meaning seems to become a kind of sham, 
properly analysed as non-normative dispositions and propensities to satisfy the 
majority view, associate sound patterns with patterns of behaviour, feel constrained by 
certain scenarios etc. If Wright denies that normativity explains these tendencies we 
identify with meaningful language use, then it is tempting to think that he could not 
explain courses of action by appeal to action-guiding prescriptions.  The normativist’s 
desired contrast in bringing normative considerations into language use is between 
dispositions to act in a certain way and prescriptions to act in a certain way; there are 
supposed to be ways we should use an expression according to the range of objectively 
correct ways of using it, which explain why we do use it in such ways when we count as 
using it correctly. But Wright seems simply to deny that there is an explanation here. 
For him, these tendencies are not explained by the idea that I should do certain 
things—things like ‘feelings of constraint’ shared among a community are all that the 
normativity of meaning amounts to on a more thorough analysis. That seems a merely 
dispositional explanation of why some things are counted by us as correct. 
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The reinterpretation of the ‘commitments’ of the contract picture in terms of my 
psychological or behavioural dispositions to keep pace with the attitudes of my peers 
might seem to suggest that the idea that we are subject to commitments is really an 
illusion.  McDowell claims that if we accept Wrights picture, we will ‘struggle to 
distinguish it’ from a similar picture where 
…the possibility of going out of step with our fellows gives us the 
illusion of being subject to norms, and consequently the illusion of 
entertaining and expressing meanings (WFR 336). 
McDowell uses this kind of ‘conjectural’ argument several times in WFR. The 
conjecture that we cannot keep Wright’s picture of consensus-based objective 
correctness, as constructed out of non-normative facts, separate from this one is used 
as part of McDowell’s important ‘Illusion Argument’: 
…once we have this [norm-free] picture, it seems impossible  simply to 
retain alongside it a different picture, in which  the openness of an 
individual  to correction by his fellows means that he is subject to 
norms. The first picture irresistibly claims primacy, leaving our 
openness to correction by our fellows looking like, at best, an 
explanation of our propensity to the illusion that we are subject to 
norms. (WFR 347, my brackets) 
The claim seems to be that we cannot accept a notion of objective correctness-values 
alongside Wright’s reduction of that notion to communal-consensus, so we cannot 
accept that the one is reducible to the other. This psychological claim is perhaps true, 
but that alone would not make Wright’s account false. What McDowell seems to think 
is that the removal of any explanatory role for norms results in our coming to conceive 
of their putative action-guiding properties as less-than-genuinely existing. This would 
be an ontological reduction of the normative to the non-normative. The Illusion 
Argument seems to say that this manoeuvre is unavoidable if we accept Wright’s 
account. That is rather odd, however: why should we make that inference, and if we do, 
why could it not be disputed?  
What McDowell apparently wants to say is that Wright’s reinterpretation of the 
contractual picture in terms of behavioural propensities means that it amounts to 
giving no more than thick descriptions of a fundamentally non-normative picture, and 
that this is the genuine picture of the world. So to say that the activity of understanding 
genuinely involves commitments would be false: the activity genuinely involves only 
attitudes and dispositions, facts about what we do and not what we should do. Wright 
may have explained why we think that we are subject to commitments, but the upshot 
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is that we are deluded; our actions are in no way genuinely guided, and there is 
nothing that we genuinely ‘should’ do. 
However, Wright is not obviously committed to this ontological reduction—the entire 
Illusion Argument rests on McDowell’s conjecture that we will be unable to resist that 
move ourselves, which is apparently not the same as saying that Wright’s argument 
entails it. Furthermore, aside from doing extreme violence to our intuitions, which 
might plausibly motivate a rejection on methodological grounds, it is unclear why the 
truth of this conjecture would indicate that Wright is mistaken.  
To substantiate the Illusion Argument, McDowell would apparently have to show that 
Wright’s argument that his anti-realism offers a more accurate analysis of what we call 
norm-governed language practice does actually entail the ontological reduction. This is 
bad news for McDowell, as the Illusion Argument is essentially the basis for his 
conclusion that “a condition for the possibility of finding real application for the notion 
of meaning at all is that we reject ‘anti-realism’” (WFR 347). The onus is very much on 
McDowell to demonstrate that the ontological reduction is unavoidable. 
The next question, though, is whether the Illusion Argument, if made sound, would 
actually present a threat to Wright. After all, normativity still has a place in his picture 
just as much as objectivity and commitments do, having been subject to a degree of 
analytical reinterpretation. Wright could just say that everything we mean by 
‘normativity’ is accounted for in this picture, and that the reason it’s not an illusion is 
the same reason that communal consensus on correctness is not an illusion of 
correctness: the contrast between what seems like normativity to the community and 
what is normativity does not arise, because the ratification-independent fact of which it 
is fails the manifestation challenge. The Illusion Argument can be defeated from within 
the anti-realist model. 
This seems an effective response so long as we grant that the fact of illusion would be a 
fact of the Logically Independent (transcendent) kind, though as I argued (§1.2), we 
need not grant that there are any such facts. 
Wright can use this kind of argument form to respond to other realist worries about 
anti-realism too. So for example, one thing that might concern us is that adherence to 
the fixed commitments of an understanding is made irrelevant by anti-realism, because 
if S commits to some fixed range of ways of applying E, the fact that the range is fixed 
will render S’s understanding faulty if the communal consensus on the correct range 
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changes, whether S’s commitments were originally shared communally or not. The 
complaint is that consistency gets you nothing here, when intuitively if you understood 
properly before and you maintain that understanding then you should still understand 
properly. Wright’s answer to this would be simple: the problem supposes that there is 
some fact of your consistency of usage beyond the communal judgment of consistency, 
when there is not. Presumably if S is out of line with the community understanding 
when he formerly agreed with it, then the community will judge that he did not 
maintain his understanding as the argument supposes, and that is the fact of the 
matter. So consistency is rewarded, but there is no fact of consistency beyond the 
community judgment. 
I will call this argument form a ‘consensus override’. Provided we do not undermine the 
premises of Wright’s account and accept the coherence of the picture, the consensus 
override allows him to dodge any worries that intuitive realist notions are absent from 
his picture on the basis that if they intuitively obtain, then the communal consensus 
will be that they obtain, and so they will obtain. It can be summarised by the following 
inference-rule: 
(CO) (It is the majority view that P) ↔ P 
 The inference from majority view to truth is permitted so long as Wright’s contractual 
picture is assumed true. This allows Wright to answer any worries about preserving 
McDowell’s ‘familiar, intuitive notion of objectivity’. That the notion is intuitive means 
that its apparent insolubility with Wright’s picture is subject to consensus override, 
such that its intuitive status entails its truth. So McDowell’s objection appears 
unfounded. 
That there is something very wrong here should be apparent. If we have correctly 
established that normal intuitive objectivity is incompatible with Wright’s view, how 
on Earth could accepting Wright’s view dissolve the contradiction? The answer, of 
course, is that it doesn’t. In fact, the derivability of CO from Wright’s commitments 
causes his account to collapse from the inside out. I call the problem ‘Implosion’. 
The problem is that, to the extent that anti-realism is revisionary and counter-intuitive, 
the majority of people do not presently believe it is true. Accordingly, if CO is true ex 
hypothesi, then we can derive the falsehood of anti-realism by CO. We cannot dodge 
this by stipulating that the truth of anti-realism transcends our consensus verdict, as 
that would be inconsistent with CO. So if CO is derivable from Wright’s commitments, 
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then his position is incoherent unless he can secure communal agreement that anti-
realism is true. 
In fact, I suggest that CO is the source of the implosion to begin with, because it is 
precisely the derivability of facts from consensus and vice versa that is so counter-
intuitive. Unless public opinion changes, CO will always entail its own denial, so 
Wright’s best hope is to revise his account to prevent the licencing of inferences from 
communal consensus to truth.  However, he may be hard pressed to achieve this 
without totally destroying the reinterpreted contractual picture he has presented. The 
best option would be to develop the picture to include some account of our 
acceptability criteria for judgments, and licence inferences from communal judgments 
to facts only for those judgments that satisfy ‘our most refined criteria of acceptability’. 
There may then be scope for arguing that such criteria would exclude the communal 
consensus that anti-realism is false (or whatever the precise threat may be) as 
indicative of truth. Perhaps we all agree on something but would prefer to know more 
before genuinely assenting to its truth. It would then become an open question 
whether our best deliberations would lead us to anti-realist conclusions, and Wright’s 
task would be to show that they should do. 
I suspect this is the kind of path Wright would want to take here, but I’m not sure it will 
work. If the community sincerely judges that anti-realism is false, it seems to follow 
that the most refined criteria of acceptability have already been met. Stipulating new 
criteria that should have been met for any such judgment will put us in a minority 
position, apparently revising things that the community already accepts. So once again, 
the only thing that can save Wright’s anti-realism is a favourable change in communal 
consensus. If McDowell can substantiate his claim that Wright’s position exceeds some 
limit of acceptable counter-intuitiveness, then there will be little scope for preventing 
the implosion of anti-realism. 
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2.4 THE BASIC LEVEL  
In WFR §5, McDowell investigates what he calls the ‘basic level’ of Wright’s account. If 
Wright presents meaning as explanatorily reducible to facts about our propensities to 
agree that certain patterns of application are better than others, the facts about 
meaning must be describable in terms of those propensities. In fact, the anti-realist 
‘manifestability criterion’ means that we must be able to characterise our language 
practices in terms of what is directly manifest to someone in behaviour, where a 
manifestation is an observable phenomenon whose intelligibility does not presuppose 
a grasp of the language in question.23 I suppose the kind of thing that would fit this 
specification might be the kinds of thing a new-born baby seems able to recognise—
aggressive behaviour, passive behaviour, repeated patterns of behaviour, and so on. 
These kinds of ‘manifest’ phenomena are the items that McDowell treats as having 
fundamental status in Wright’s account, such that Wright must deny that a general 
account of language practice in terms not ontologically reduced to non-linguistic 
phenomena could give us the real facts about language. I suggest McDowell might be 
right about this even if the Illusion Argument is unsound, given that Wright’s broader 
anti-realist project is to ontologically reduce any concepts of which a grasp cannot be 
made fully manifest in behaviour to concepts that can. As such, any genuine concepts 
will be explanatorily reducible to these ‘basic level’ behavioural terms. 
McDowell leads into his analysis by discussing ‘calling things yellow’ in contrast with 
‘things being yellow’. I will trace the reasoning, because it motivates some of his 
criticisms of Wright with respect to the ‘basic level’.  First, McDowell posits a 
supposedly intuitive distinction between fulfilling the order “bring me a yellow flower” 
and fulfilling the order “bring me the flower that gave you a feeling of satisfaction after 
what I said”.24 The aim is to show that although the possibility of this distinction 
reinforces Wright’s critique of the ‘idiolectic’ conception of understanding, his own 
positive account ultimately makes it unintelligible. 
Note that there is supposed to be an obvious parallel between the idea of executing 
orders and using expressions correctly, as follows: fulfilling an order is like applying an 
expression correctly in that certain ranges of actions are prescribed by an order and by 
the meaning of an expression, and respecting either means performing an action of 
located within the range. Any concerns we might have about this parallel can be 
                                                             
23 Cf. §2.2 above. 
24 WFR 335; the Wittgenstein passage quoted is Philosophical Investigations §460. 
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suspended on the assumption that a language-use example could be substituted in, as 
the example is merely illustrative. 
According to Wright, the problem with idiolectic understanding is that one cannot 
distinguish between the correctness of one’s actions relative to such an understanding 
and the mere impression of such relative correctness. If it seems to me that an action is 
relatively correct (in this case, ‘if the action gave me a feeling of satisfaction’) then on 
the ‘idiolectic’ picture I will form the conviction that it really is correct.  
However, McDowell points out that for Wright there is a precise parallel between the 
inability of an individual to distinguish objective correctness from the impression 
thereof and the inability of the whole linguistic community to do the same, where 
correctness is conceived in realist terms as determined by something more than 
communal agreement. But if there is an irreducible distinction between the fact of 
something’s being yellow and the fact of its being called ‘yellow’ by most speakers of 
English, inference rule CO leaves no room for it because they are true (or ‘applicable’) 
in precisely the same situations. 
At this point Wright might respond that room is made for the distinction by virtue of 
the fact that the predicates  ‘is yellow’ and ‘would be called yellow by most speakers of 
English’ are used in different ways or have different cognitive significance. But that will 
lead Wright into difficulty, because it undermines his strategy of explanatorily reducing 
‘truth’ to ‘communal consensus’, on the basis that the distinction is not a distinction in 
phenomena but a distinction in ways of describing communal consensus. If we accept 
the distinction between ‘is yellow’ and ‘would be called yellow by most speakers of 
English’ on Wright’s terms we will have to accept that the latter is an analysis of the 
former. But McDowell’s very plausible claim is that we should not accept this, precisely 
because those two predicates are used in different ways or have different cognitive 
significance. So this point apparently works against Wright here. 
Of course, the success of this argument depends on our acceptance that the fact that we 
make such distinctions in our non-theoretical usage of our language means that such 
distinctions are ultimately substantial. But it seems Wright could simply deny this in 
revisionist spirit—certainly the distinction exists in ordinary language, but the 
existence of two different predicates that are applied in different ways need not 
correspond to the actual existence of two different properties. He could argue that our 
tendency to think that ‘being yellow’ means a different thing from ‘being called yellow 
by most speakers of English’ rests on a mistake. 
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So we need a reason to accept that such a contrast exists in reality and is not something 
projected by us. One thing that might appeal is that, intuitively, ‘would be called yellow’ 
implies ‘might not be yellow’. Indeed, this intuition presents a pervasive difficulty for 
Wright. His aim is to draw a contrast between communal consensus as truth and a 
realist notion of truth. But if Wright’s account is correct, then what we mean by ‘truth’ 
is what he is calling ‘communal consensus’, and we do not call truth ‘communal 
consensus’. Rather, communal consensus is what we call ‘communal consensus’! The 
concept seems to be abused in Wright’s hands; ‘consensus’ is something we normally 
oppose to more objective things like true judgments. And that is precisely what he 
aims to do in opposing it to a realist conception of truth as more than consensus. But if 
we reject that conception as he desires, then in what respect is it the case that we 
merely agree? It seems that if there is no difference for us between what our ‘most 
refined criteria of acceptability’ tell us is true and what really is true, then we should 
conclude not that truth is ontologically reducible to acceptability, but that those 
‘criteria of acceptability’ are truth-conditions. It seems the only appropriate kind of 
reduction would be an explanatory one, but then we stumble over the intuition that 
consensus that P and the fact that P are non-identical, as the fact that P amounts to 
more than consensus. 
This issue is a development of the implosion problem (§2.3). If Wright says that the 
fact of the matter is that truth is correctly analysed as communal consensus, then that 
fact of the matter can only be a consensus-transcending fact of a realist variety because 
our standing practice of considering consensus inferior to true judgement would 
render it false, because we would judge it false. Of course, this is a problem for any 
revisionary aspect of Wright’s account, and equally so for the case of ‘is yellow’. 
The facts of this kind that Wright claims as fundamental, that we deal in communal 
agreement rather than truth, constitute the ‘basic level’ picture McDowell describes: 
… a picture of human beings vocalizing in certain ways in response to 
objects, with this behaviour (no doubt) accompanied by such ‘inner’ 
phenomena as feelings of constraint, or convictions of the rightness of 
what they are saying… (WFR 336) 
The picture is couched in terms of ‘behaviour’ and ‘convictions’ rather than 
applications of expressions and use of concepts because these are the kind of things in 
which the latter can be ‘directly manifest’.  Aside from the implosion issue, the problem 
we might find with this analysis is that the commitments of the reinterpreted 
contractual picture would not be properly analysed as action-guiding commitments at 
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the ‘basic level’, but as dispositions (acquired individually) to secure the assent of our 
peers. And the problem with dispositions, so the Kripke argument goes, is that they do 
not guide action; they are not normative.25 If this is right, then the contractual picture 
does not involve normativity at the basic level, so at the basic level our language 
practices are not meaningful. 
That might seem reasonable, even to a normativist. From one perspective, the basic 
level is just an analysis of language as a natural animal phenomenon, as a naturalist 
analyses the practice we call ‘building a dam’ in terms of the behavioural patterns and 
propensities of beavers, rather than in terms of engineering and aquatic infrastructure. 
Those latter concepts are projected onto the situation by us, and a beaver does not 
need them to undertake the activity we call ‘building a dam’. All Wright seems to be 
saying is that any language practice we have should be analysed in terms of the 
behavioural patterns and propensities of humans, because learning that practice must 
not ultimately rely on things like meaning and language, which are things we project 
onto the situation having learned the language in question 
But note that any conception of what the beaver is doing is projected onto his 
activities, even the notion ‘pattern of behaviour’. That is why we describe the practice 
in terms of ‘brute movement and causal explanation’, as McDowell puts it, to avoid 
crediting the beaver with a perspective on his activities that he does not have.26 But 
when any analysis we give of human language practices presupposes the linguistic 
competence of the analyst, who is also the subject of analysis, why is it preferable to 
describe what he does in terms of behaviour, when any description we can give will be 
one he understands? The problem is to say why concepts like meaning are projected 
while others like behaviour are not. What Wright apparently wants to say is that if we 
could imagine the world from a perspective where nothing was meaningful for us, then 
the facts about language practices would be facts about the way we behave and not the 
meaning of expressions. The reason for thinking this is that the facts in question would 
not involve language, because language necessarily involves meaning—but then why 
say that, considered from our perspective, those facts would be facts about behaviour 
and not facts about meaning? Surely it would be more appropriate to admit that the 
facts would be inexpressible, because they are not couched in language. The claim that 
behaviour is basic is accordingly under-motivated. 
                                                             
25 Cf. K p.37. 
26 Cf. WFR 339 
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McDowell does not take this line, and instead focuses on the supposed absence of 
normativity at the ‘basic level’. He invokes the ‘Illusion Argument’ introduced in my 
§2.3 to argue that the absence of normativity at the basic level of Wright’s picture 
amounts to the claim that, strictly speaking, normativity does not exist. However, we 
have already seen problems with this strategy, as it involves identifying the 
reducibility of correctness to consensus as ontological reducibility, when Wright could 
apparently deny this. 
Fortunately for McDowell, Wright seems to make the kinds of ontological reductions he 
is accused of, such as to make an illusion of notions like objective truth. The 
revisionism underpinning much of Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics is 
apparently intended to extend to our ordinary conceptions of the way things are. 
Consider, for example, the following passage: 
The dilemma we confront as a community is thus essentially that of the 
private linguist: faced with the impossibility of establishing any 
technique of comparison between our judgment and the putative 
objective fact, we must construe the fact either as something we cannot 
know at all or—the classic choice for the private linguist—as something 
we cannot but know. Wittgenstein’s response is to urge that both 
courses are equally disreputable; and that we should therefore 
abandon the conception which leads to the dilemma. If we do so, we 
shall reject the idea that, in the senses requisite for investigation-
independence, the community goes right or wrong in accepting a 
particular verdict on a decidable question; rather, it just goes. (W, 
p.220) 
On the highly plausible assumption that Wright endorses Wittgenstein’s response here, 
the claim he makes is that we, the community, should reject the conception of the whole 
community ‘going right or wrong’. His idea is apparently not just to make some merely 
academic claim that leaves our everyday linguistic practices intact, but rather to totally 
revise our ideas about correctness. The idea of investigation-independent facts is thus 
construed as an illusion—which confirms McDowell’s claim that we lose out on an 
intuitive conception of objectivity. 
So long as the picture of the ‘basic level’ follows from this commitment, it seems fair to 
say that revising our conception of facts and correctness in this way, as Wright 
demands, would mean accepting the basic level picture as ‘the real truth’. So McDowell 
is right: it would be impossible to distinguish the kind of commitments Wright 
describes from the illusion of commitments, since properties constructed on top of the 
basic level do not reflect the way the world really is. As such, Wright’s reinterpretation 
of the contractual picture amount either to a concession that it does not really obtain, 
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thus failing to meet the minimal adequacy conditions for an account of meaning and 
understanding here, or that meaning is not normative, denying the basic premise of the 
debate. 
The original problem of distinguishing between the fact that a flower is yellow and the 
fact that it would be called ‘yellow’ by most speakers of English is a scaled down 
version of the problems Wright encounters as I have presented them here.  He must 
maintain that there is a difference between commitments and the illusion of 
commitments, but McDowell argues that they are unavoidably construed as illusion 
because putative basic level facts cannot “be prevented from purporting to contain the 
real truth about linguistic behaviour” (WFR 336).  However, this argument would be 
undermined if Wright simply toned down his revisionism, to identify the concepts of 
objective correctness and communal consensus on an equal plane. I have suggested an 
alternative line of criticism to the effect that ‘basic level’ facts are not obviously facts 
about behavioural propensities rather than facts about correctness. If we do not 
presuppose a command of the language in question then the events underlying 
language are not describable at all, so if we are willing to go as far as offering a 
description using the language we know, then why limit the range of concepts we use 
to characterise the situation to concepts that describe non-linguistic phenomena?  
I have argued that Wright constantly has to grapple with the problem that the terms he 
uses to characterise intuitively ‘realist’ concepts tend to characterise them poorly, the 
most pressing case being the use of ‘consensus’ to characterise true judgment.  This 
issue resurfaces here when we consider the contrast between activities that lack a 
meaning, like ‘behaving in such and such a way’, and meaningful activities like 
‘claiming that P’. Wright needs to say that the former kind of thing, properly arranged, 
amounts to the latter kind of thing. But from the perspective of someone located within 
Wright’s reinterpretation of the contractual picture, it would just seem false that the 
former could amount to the latter because the latter is meaningful to him, and the 
former is stipulated as having no meaning in itself. His experience of language is 
apparently not one of people making noises and exhibiting positive behavioural 
responses, but of people communicating and speaking correctly—asserting, denying, 
ordering, expressing, and so on. How could a configuration of non-meaningful things 
amount to meaning? This and other questions motivate McDowell’s positive account of 
the contractual picture, which I will investigate in Chapter 4. 
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3  UNDERSTANDING AS INTERPRETATION 
3.1  INTERPRETATIONS & PARADOX 
As McDowell proceeds in his analysis, he becomes noticeably preoccupied with what 
emerges as a central question, namely, how it is that one can understand something 
without ‘interpreting’ it. He claims (WFR §§3-4) that failing to answer this question 
leads to a regress, one that cannot be defused without adopting unappealing additional 
theses about meaning and understanding.  
The postulated regress says that if every kind of understanding is an interpretation of 
some kind of input, then an understanding of whatever it is that makes such 
interpretations correct is also open to interpretation itself, and so on, generating a 
‘regress of interpretations’. But what is an ‘interpretation’ here? McDowell does not 
explain this. Indeed, the term is Wittgenstein’s, and he did not explain it either.27 We 
will have to divine the meaning of ‘interpretation’ from the use McDowell, Kripke and 
Wright make of it. Fortunately, the task is not so difficult. 
On his example of understanding the ‘plus’ sign, Kripke famously writes: 
…it seems that no matter what is in my mind at a given time, I am free 
in the future to interpret it in different ways (K, p.107). 
The process of interpretation here seems to be something like attributing a particular 
meaning to something one holds consciously in mind. McDowell offers the following 
gloss on this quotation, and on the formulation of Kripke’s ‘sceptical paradox’: 
That is, whatever piece of mental furniture I cite, acquired by me as a 
result of my training in arithmetic, it is open to the sceptic to point out 
that my present performance keeps faith with it only on one 
interpretation of it, and other interpretations are possible. So it cannot 
constitute my understanding ‘plus’ in such a way as to dictate the 
answer I give. Such a state of understanding would require not just the 
original item but also my having put the right interpretation on it. But 
what could constitute my having put the right interpretation on some 
mental item? And now the argument can evidently be repeated. (WFR 
329) 
Before we look at the argument we can use this analysis to get an idea of what 
‘understanding as interpretation’ would amount to. Clearly, that picture involves some 
                                                             
27 McDowell’s source is PI §201. 
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notion of ‘mental objects’ that are usable in some conscious way to justify actions as 
correct. Zalabardo (2002, p.286) helpfully suggests that the notion of justification here 
involves a requirement of “conscious engagement with the facts”. If this is correct, as it 
looks to be, then if ‘mental objects’ are the kinds of things to which we look for 
justification then they must be the sorts of things with which we consciously engage, or 
at least try to. This seems to mean that the objects in question are imagined as 
consciously accessible, such that I can refer back to them. Moreover, they provide me 
with a standard by which to judge the correctness of my actions. 
In our terminology, this is a picture of correctness relative to an understanding. In the 
case of expression usage, we stipulated (§1.3) that on the minimal contractual picture, 
relative correctness arises when S undertakes to limit his usage of the expression to a 
particular range of ways of using it. We left it open how S makes this undertaking. The 
conception of understanding as interpretation seems to offer one possibility, namely 
that the range is something I can ‘consciously engage’ with. Understanding thus 
involves my committing to restrain my usage to a range of ways of using the 
expression communicated by some mental item. However, which range the item itself 
communicates is subject to ‘interpretation’: its meaning is something I must infer from 
the mental item itself. Similarly, regarding a particular application of an expression I 
can only justify my judgment that it falls within a particular range of usage by inferring 
that it does, appealing to mental items of this kind to justify the inference. 
So McDowell’s gloss on Kripke’s paradox, based on this conception, says that problems 
arise when we conceive the justifying mental item as something of a similar kind which 
itself needs interpretation. If understanding an application to mean a particular thing 
involves interpreting it in a particular way, hence making some inference that it does, 
then that particular inference must be justifiable by appeal to an understanding of 
some mental item that prescribes the inference. If the understanding of that mental 
item also amounts to an interpretation of it, hence an inference to what inference was 
sanctioned originally, then this new inference must also be justifiable by appeal to an 
understanding of something else that sanctions this inference, and so on apparently 
into regress. 
Kripke’s sceptic aims to show that facts about present usage, meaning and 
understanding cannot justify future instances of usage, meaning and understanding. As 
Kripke puts it, “a fact as to what I mean now is supposed to justify my future actions, to 
make them inevitable if I wish to use words with the same meaning with which I used 
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them before” (K, p.40); but the argument is supposed to show that such facts can 
provide neither justification nor inevitability for my future usage because appealing to 
them for justification means understanding (interpreting) them in a particular way, an 
action that itself requires justification, and so on. Incidentally, I think we ought to 
understand ‘inevitability’ here in terms of the M1 determinacy of relative correctness-
value for a particular application, relative to a particular understanding. If 
understanding is always conceived in terms of ‘interpretation’, as it is here, then it is 
impossible for me to justify my interpretation of the range of correct usage to which I 
commit as counting the application as either correct or incorrect. 
The idea is that if our actions are beyond justification, then they are not really 
objectively prescribed so much as simply chosen by us. The premise that justification 
requires ‘conscious engagement with the facts’ is notable in its epistemological 
internalism about justifications, and an appropriate externalist account could possibly 
defuse the worry. However, I cannot pursue this line here. 
The relative correctness-value of a given application is assigned by the understanding 
in question by virtue of the range of usage to which it commits us. But the challenge 
here is to justify any claim to having honoured the commitment when the range 
specified also requires interpretation. This would be true beyond the case of a merely 
personal understanding, and McDowell notes that it relates to Wright’s rejection of the 
idea that the community adheres to a ratification-independent pattern of application 
(WFR §3). If a community aims to commit to a particular range of ways of using an 
expression, then their joint claim that a given application is correct relative to that 
understanding is based on one of numerous possible interpretations of the range. 
Everyone may agree that an application falls within the range, but there is apparently 
nothing we can use to justify our agreement that does not also require interpretation 
of this kind. This seems to support Wright’s conclusion that we should reject the  
requirement to justify our agreement by something extra-judgmental, that the 
community does not go right or wrong with respect to agreement; “rather, it just goes” 
(W, p.220).28 
 
 
                                                             
28 Cf. my §2.4. 
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We might model the ‘interpretation’ conception of understanding with an analogy. 
Imagine the community makes judgments of correctness with reference to a chart: 
Application Correctness-Value 
A Correct 
B Correct 
C Incorrect 
D Incorrect 
… … 
Judging whether application B is correct, they consult the chart and decide that it is. 
Kripke’s sceptic would then object that this judgment assumes one particular 
interpretation of the chart, and demand justification for choosing that interpretation. 
Why not read the chart in a different way?  If all they can cite are further charts, i.e. 
charts showing how to read charts and so on, then a regress obviously ensues. 
The pertinent question is why we would think understanding operates in a comparable 
way, and whether the realist contractual picture need assume it does. Specifically, the 
concern arises: why must the mental item which is supposed to justify my 
interpretation of a particular expression application also be something of the same 
‘interpretable’ character as the application itself? The fact that I understand my 
commitment on the contractual model does not mean that I am free to interpret that 
commitment however I wish—the problem here does not seem to be so much that I 
have to appeal to something in my mind to justify my actions, as might be argued, but 
rather that we imagine that ‘something’ to need interpreting too. Perhaps this view 
would be inspired by the idea that the mental object is something like an instruction 
that I obey when I interpret the language use (perhaps also an instruction) in a certain 
way. That seems to be what underlies the ‘chart’ analogy, if it is a good one.  
There is apparently nothing in the contractual picture that says we need conceive our 
mental objects in this way—we commit to restricting our use to a particular range, and 
in that there is not obviously any interpretation involved. However, I think the 
motivation for conceiving them this way comes from the idea of citing mental objects 
as justification. Kripke’s idea seems to be that I must in principle be able to consciously 
engage with some mental item that would justify my interpretation of (e.g.) the ‘plus’ 
sign. But if conscious engagement means the kind of thing I do when I listen to 
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someone speaking, and I am able to interpret his meaning in any number of ways 
(provided I can adequately justify myself), then it seems I should be able to interpret 
my mental items in any number of ways too. That is not the only possible gloss on 
‘conscious engagement’ however, so it is admittedly not conclusive that this is what 
motivates the conception that an understanding of anything, even of mental items, 
involves a fallible interpretive process. McDowell does not venture to explore what the 
motivation is—that would apparently be a task to follow the missing account of what 
‘interpretation’ amounts to here—but there is evidence that he lays the blame on a 
failure to reject certain core ideas of Problematic Realism.29 I discuss this in more 
detail in the final chapter (§4.4), as it might seem a surprising charge to bring against 
the anti-realistically inclined. 
At present we should focus on one particular claim that generate the justificatory 
regress: that we must be at least able in principle to provide conclusive justification for 
the claim (e.g.) that a particular application is prescribed rather than another. This is a 
characteristically sceptical challenge, as we must be able to explain what it is that 
makes some action correct relative to an understanding in a way that leaves no room 
for deviant ‘grue’ interpretations of what it commits us to. If my particular application 
is to be inevitable, as it apparently should be in the favoured example case where a) I 
am engaged in the activity of answering addition problems correctly, b) I seem to 
understand addition and the meanings of the terms involved according to ordinary 
judgments of such competence, and c) I do not make some procedural error in my 
assessment of whether the expression “125” is appropriately applied in response to 
the question “What is 68+57?”, then the sceptical challenge is to demonstrate that a full 
characterisation of everything that justifies my saying that “125” is correct relative to 
my understanding can be provided in principle. And of course, the premise that 
anything I could use to justify this claim is subject to various interpretations will leave 
the sceptic’s challenge unanswered, as we conceive every putative justification for 
thinking, acting, speaking (etc.) in some particular way, including the making claims of 
the form ‘this justifies that’, as requiring justification.  
Kripke presents the sceptical paradox as an insurmountable challenge to provide a fact 
that shows I mean one thing rather than another by my (apparent) use of addition, the 
actual upshot being, on McDowell’s summary, that “there is no fact that could 
constitute my having attached one rather than another meaning to the ‘plus’ sign” 
(WFR 329). This slightly odd turn of phrase is meant to indicate that the supposedly 
                                                             
29 Cf. WFR §11 in particular. 
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unavoidable regress fundamentally undermines the idea that any mere fact could make 
it the case, just by obtaining, that I mean one thing in particular by my use of the ‘plus’ 
sign. If relying on interpretations of the dictates of my understanding generates the 
regress, no fact about my understanding can commit me to meaning one thing rather 
than another—to meaning green rather than grue or plus rather than quus—because 
my understanding alone is apparently unequipped to guarantee that I do the sort of 
thing I committed myself to doing. McDowell seems to agree with this: there is no hope 
for this conception of understanding for precisely these reasons, so we should reject 
the idea that understanding is always a kind of interpretation. That is rather quick, 
however, and we would seem to be accepting the sceptic’s demands without 
questioning whether they are reasonable, as well as being impressed by the putative 
regress. In fact, it will emerge (§4.2) that McDowell’s dialectical approach here is not to 
engage with Kripke’s sceptic at all, but to reject the challenge by presenting a superior 
account of the relation between meaning and understanding. 
Kripke’s aim in analysis of the paradox is not to show that expressions can never be 
meaningful, but to show that some kind of anti-realist justification-based semantics 
needs to replace our traditional truth-conditional accounts. Sentences like “I have 
attached a determinate meaning to the word ‘green’” are then not false but merely 
misleading; they should be understood “in terms of their use to record acceptance of 
individuals into the linguistic community” (WFR 330). Making contact with Wright’s 
anti-realism, Kripke’s ‘sceptical solution’ to the sceptical paradox aims to preserve 
meaningful language use with the crucial caveat that ‘meaningful language use’ here is 
really a term of art that is explanatorily reducible to behavioural practices which are in 
line with the preferences and propensities of the linguistic community. 
McDowell’s arguments for rejecting the sceptical solution are highly condensed, but his 
main criticism seems to take the following form: 
The right response to the paradox … is not to accept it but to correct the 
misunderstanding on which it depends: that is, to realize ‘that there is a 
way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation’. (WFR 331) 
He offers two arguments in support of this claim. The first is as follows:  
It is natural to suppose that if one says ‘There is no fact that could 
constitute its being the case that P’, one precludes oneself from 
affirming that P; and this supposition, so far from being a distinctively 
‘realist’ one, plays a central role in the standard arguments against 
‘realism’. Given this supposition, the concession that Kripke… makes to 
the sceptic becomes a denial that I understand the ‘plus’ sign to mean 
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one thing rather than another. And now—generalizing the denial—we 
do seem to have fallen into an abyss: ‘the incredible and self-defeating 
conclusion, that all language is meaningless’… It is quite obscure how 
we could hope to claw ourselves back by manipulating the notion of 
accredited membership in a linguistic community. (WFR 330) 
On the face of it, this is not so different from the ‘illusion’ argument McDowell uses to 
criticise Wright. However, at the end of Chapter 2 I suggested that perhaps the real 
substance to that argument is that the kind of anti-realist claims being made are false 
from the perspective of someone who operates within the anti-realist picture being 
described.30 Though the passage is a little obscure, the argument seems roughly to be 
that if the sceptic’s challenge leads to the conclusion that ‘no fact can be found that 
could constitute its being the case that P’, then the appropriate response is to revise 
our premises and working definition of ‘fact’ to account for this, unless we accept that 
the sceptic has won and that we never have justification for thinking that P.  However, 
the first option seems to leave concepts like truth and falsehood basically intact, 
merely accepting that they cannot be explained in this particular paradox-generating 
way. To infer that they are unsalvageable is too quick from this perspective, but 
McDowell accuses Kripke of doing just that in “conceding that the sceptic’s negative 
assertions are unanswerable” (K, p.66). McDowell seems to be playing on the idea we 
saw in §2.4 that trying to reconstruct what we call ‘truth’ out of less imposing concepts 
like justification leaves us with something short of that original concept at the non-
theoretical level. If we want it to be a genuine truth that justification is all truth can 
amount to, then we seem to have said not just that truth must be conceived in a 
particular way for coherence, but also that it is something less rigid and objective that 
we are inclined to think. 
The apparent analogy in meaning and language would be that if it were a genuine fact 
of the matter that words have no meaning, that would seem to licence the conclusion 
“that all language is meaningless”. But this is just the ‘Illusion Argument’ again, and we 
only found grounds for that as applied to Wright because a) on Wright’s account, the 
derivability of CO means that generally counter-intuitive claims are false, and b) we 
found good reason to suppose that Wright intends his claims to be taken as facts that 
should be acknowledged as the ‘real truth’ about correctness etc. Given that a) is not 
obviously an option for Kripke’s case, McDowell would have to show that Kripke 
intends his revisionary ‘justification-conditions’ project for a theory of meaning to be 
                                                             
30 Note that Wright’s apparent acceptance of CO was what leads from this to the ‘implosion’ 
problem. It is not so obvious that this principle is derivable from Kripke’s ‘sceptical solution’, 
though of course if it is he will face that problem too. 
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acknowledged as more than an explanation of where our perfectly well-functioning 
everyday concept of sentence truth comes from; that he intends it to detract from that 
everyday concept in some sense. This would give McDowell some grounds for applying 
the Illusion Argument here—but pending that, Kripke might just be able to deny that a 
revisionary theory of meaning need revise our intuition that language is meaningful. 
The absence of truth-conditional semantics from a theory of meaning does not 
obviously entail any weakening of the notion of truth that is held by speakers of the 
object language. 
3.2 SUPER-RIGIDITY 
If meaning is only possible by virtue of our common ability to adhere, in what we say, 
to the rules that govern permissible meaningful usage of expressions in language, then 
it cannot be the case that every rule is always open to interpretation or I could never 
be sure of meaning the same thing by a given expression as you do. McDowell’s 
concern about Kripke’s ‘sceptical solution’ seems to be that the intuitive certainty and 
confidence with which we use expressions is totally undermined by the sceptical 
paradox, and so the switch to a focus on acceptance in a linguistic community would 
not be able to restore it. 
In order to avoid this consequence, McDowell encourages a defence of the idea that we 
have fundamentally shared commitments in language usage, and not merely in patterns 
of meaningless behaviour. This would mean preserving the idea, contra the paradox, 
that there is a fact that ‘could constitute its being the case that P’. But that means 
challenging the sceptic’s arguments rather than accepting them as Kripke does, and of 
course the strategy here is to challenge the premise that understanding is always a 
kind of interpretation. Presented in a way that also addresses McDowell’s ‘illusion’ 
concerns about Wright’s anti-realism, the contention is that if we are committed to 
more than simply keeping our peers satisfied then there must be a sense in which we 
understand the meaning of an expression without a mediating interpretation. 
McDowell argues against the idea that the problem can be solved without rejecting the 
conception of all understanding as interpretation. That would require an explanation 
of how, at some level, we always interpret the mental object (still totally ambiguous in 
itself) in the correct way.  This amounts to the following unlikely ‘super-rigid machine’ 
conception of understanding: 
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Understanding an expression … must be possessing an interpretation 
that cannot be interpreted—an interpretation that precisely bridges 
the gap, exploited in the sceptical argument, between the instruction 
one received in learning the expression and the use one goes on to 
make of it. (WFR 332) 
The mythology translates roughly as the idea that I am gifted with an inexplicably 
reliable ability to interpret certain action-guiding inputs of the consciously engage-able 
kind in the same way every time. If in understanding the meaning of an expression 
there is a range of ways of using it to which I commit, and that range is something I can 
commit to only by virtue of some mental item I possess interpreted in a particular way, 
then such an understanding is ‘super-rigid’ just in case I always interpret that mental 
item in that particular way. So I can break off the regress by appealing to my super-
rigid understanding of one of the interpretations in the chain—and of course, the same 
idea might be applied not at the level described but at some further point down the 
chain of justifying interpretations. Put this way, the ‘super-rigid machine’ idea just 
seems an ad hoc response to the regress of interpretations; we simply postulate a level 
at which our troublesome freedom to interpret action-guiding inputs in more than one 
way is curtailed. 
It is important for McDowell’s attempt to build an alternative contractual picture that 
we understand this as problematic mainly due to its attempt to end the regress by 
postulating a step in the chain of reasoning which is identical to those that precede it, 
albeit with the crucial caveat that it ends the chain, and not due to the mere fact that it 
involves understanding of a kind that is not subject to (mis)interpretation. For if it 
should be rejected simply on the latter grounds, then McDowell’s overarching aim to 
reject the idea that understanding is always interpretation looks like exactly that 
manoeuvre, an attempt to evade the problem by insisting that some kinds of 
understanding are not subject to interpretation in the regress-generating way.  
Rather, as he puts it in a later work, here the ‘meaning’ of the ‘plus’ sign that we might 
claim to understand super-rigidly is conceived of “as an item of the same character as 
the interpretations that succeed one another when one embarks on the regress” 
(McDowell 2009a, p.83). In the ‘chart’ example (§3 above) this would mean referring 
back to a foundational chart which, though simply a chart like any other, is somehow 
totally unambiguous, such that one cannot but interpret it correctly. 
Such charts clearly do not exist. If the analogy is a good one, then by ‘an item of the 
same character as the interpretations’ we would seem to mean something very much 
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like ‘unambiguous verbal instructions for interpreting verbal instructions for 
interpreting verbal instructions…,’ and so on, except perhaps that the instructions 
would not be verbal but instead couched in a language of thought (one of Wright’s 
troublesome ‘idiolects’), or in thoughts themselves, or in otherwise super-rigid mental 
states. Super-rigidity of any kind seems to entail totally infallibility in some kinds of 
practices, which is thoroughly implausible. We might argue that one of the tenets of 
‘conscious engagement’ would have to be that anything done consciously is done 
without this kind of super-rigidity, ruling out (by Kripke’s standards) any appeal to 
interpretations arrived at by super-rigid interpretive faculties as facts that could count 
as justifying claims to mean one thing rather than another. That seems plausible, 
though it would need development that I cannot offer here. I will merely suggest, 
following McDowell31, that this connects with the kind of criticism that Wright makes 
of an idiolectic conception of understanding as offering justification for absolutely any 
sincere verdicts I draw regarding the relative correctness of my own actions. 
However, as noted earlier McDowell’s strategy is to reject the account of 
understanding that generates the problem to which the super-rigid conception is a 
response. On the assumption that super-rigidity is sufficiently problematic, McDowell 
presents accepting Kripke’s sceptical paradox and accepting a ‘super-rigid machine’ 
solution to it as two horns of a dilemma that must be confronted if we fail to reject the 
conception of all understanding as interpretation (WFR 331-2). But whether either 
presents an intractable picture in itself, hence meriting the title ‘horn of a dilemma,’ is 
not really up for discussion in WFR. McDowell is clearly convinced that neither option 
is sustainable on its own merits—and recall that he seems to see Kripke’s ‘sceptical 
solution’ as no better than accepting the sceptic’s own conclusion that language is 
meaningless. For reasons that will become apparent in the next chapter, I will refer to 
this as the ‘Small Dilemma’. 
Presenting the dilemma as based on false premises significantly improves McDowell’s 
position in the dialectic. If the diagnosis is correct then it does not matter whether his 
previous arguments for rejecting Kripke’s sceptical solution are convincing. If the 
paradox is generated by a mistake, then the correct response is to correct the mistake 
and stop it from arising in the first place. Correspondingly, it also does not matter 
whether we ought to reject the super-rigid machine mythology for being an ad hoc 
response, unintuitive, implausible etc. because it is a response to a problem that should 
not arise. As such, all attempts to respond to McDowell’s prior treatment of these 
                                                             
31 Cf. WFR 332-3 
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topics will be thwarted if he can demonstrate that there is a more fundamental 
problem, and that we ought to reject the dilemma. This, in effect, becomes the primary 
goal of the paper. 
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4  MEANING-PERSPECTIVISM 
4.1 MCDOWELL’S TASK 
In preceding chapters I have examined various lines of enquiry that McDowell pursues 
in WFR, and attempted to provide some sense of the dialectic outside of his attempt to 
demonstrate that Wright and Kripke have produced readings of Wittgenstein that are 
not historically representative. I have suggested that Wright’s strong reductionism 
leaves him open to McDowell’s charge of unacceptable counter-intuitiveness, alongside 
a risk that his position will undermine itself. However, McDowell’s attempts to make 
the charge of counter-intuitiveness stick for Kripke’s case are less convincing because 
Kripke does not seem to hold the same revisionist agenda. 
He thus appeals to the broad strategy of the ‘Illusion Argument’, which aims to show 
that if claims about meaning and understanding are ontologically reducible to claims 
about the non-meaningful activities and attitudes of human beings, then this somehow 
makes the former claims less than genuinely representative of the truth, such that ‘x 
means y’ will not be strictly representative of the facts, compared to something like 
‘when people say “x” they are expecting others to react in a particular way w’ (for 
example). However, the Illusion Argument is not effective against anti-realists who 
make merely explanatory reductions. If water is explanatorily reducible to H2O, 
nothing controversial about the reality of water follows. 
McDowell apparently needs to say why characterising meaning in terms of non-
normative behaviour and other basic level elements will always be an ontological 
reduction, or why it otherwise detracts from the normativist’s intuition that those who 
understand meaning are subject to norms, if the Illusion Argument is to be successful. 
Being ‘subject to norms’ may be a legitimate way of conceiving of being inclined, at the 
basic level, to do some things rather than others, and sharing that inclination with 
others.  
In fact, I think that is the sort of account that McDowell might want to propose. His 
criticism of Wright and Kripke is aimed at their rejection of truth-conditional 
semantics, and the project of replacing it with an anti-realist or otherwise 
justificationist alternative, not merely the project of explaining the former in terms of 
the latter. Even Kripke says that claims about someone’s meaning something cannot be 
analysed beyond the fact that there are “roughly specifiable circumstances under 
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which they are legitimately assertable, and that the game of asserting them under such 
conditions has a role in our lives,” such that “no supposition that ‘facts correspond’ to 
those assertions is needed” (K, p.78). It seems right to characterise this as a denial that 
a truth-conditional analysis is appropriate, given the charge of superfluity.  
 McDowell thus sees both Wright and Kripke as attempting to say that certain things 
are true about language, while simultaneously denying our apparent intuition that 
things like true judgments of fact are meaningful and correct by virtue of more than the 
significance of their component words to us. However, the opposition of the 
justification model to our standard notion of truth seems to leave it mysterious what 
the contrast amounts to. What can be meant by the apparent claim that what we call 
‘truth’ is something less than truth—given that we also call that latter thing ‘truth’? 
It seems anti-realists must be saying that things that we ordinarily take to be true are 
less than true, but depend merely on justifiability: but then this presupposes some 
other kind of truth that our justifiable judgments ordinarily fail to respect, it being at 
best a happy coincidence if our judgments coincide with this superior kind of truth. But 
this is coupled with the claim that our ordinary notion of truth is really such a notion of 
justifiability conditions: so then surely we should be saying that judgments we 
ordinarily take to be true (because we are appropriate justified in doing so) really are 
true, not merely appropriately justified. But then we seem to have lost our point of 
reference for the claim that our ordinary notion of truth is not really truth. We can 
apparently reject some transcendent notion of truth as something inaccessible as 
championed by the Problematic Realist—which I have argued that this is not to be 
identified with realism in general—because that conception seems to entail the claim 
that we are never justified in judging judgments true. But the denial of truth-
conditional semantics seems falsified by the idea that we are respecting all and any 
notions of truth to which we do have access, and if we reject surprisingly strong realist 
principles like LI then there is no reason to think that the notion of truth is in danger 
here. The only way we can force that conclusion is by arguing (somehow!) that truth is 
not really a concept that applies in our language practices, and that justification is 
really what we mean by truth. But that kind of argument is error-theoretic, and seems 
to tell us that nothing is really true; that truth is an illusion. This is the motivation for 
McDowell’s ‘Illusion Argument’ strategy, which is supposed to show that if we get this 
far then it will follow that meaning is an illusion. 
Rule-Following, Normativity & Objectivity 
 
62 
 
However shaky that may seem, the Illusion Argument also draws on an additional 
point McDowell hopes to demonstrate: that both Wright and Kripke allegedly assume, 
wrongly, that understanding is always something like an interpretive process. Pressing 
this point means attempting to deny a premise that underpins their arguments, and 
showing that the debate here revolves around a faulty account of understanding would 
be a great achievement. Strictly speaking, McDowell’s aims are slightly more modest 
than this. He conceives his positive claims as providing an exit route from a dilemma 
generated by the assumption. This fact alone does not validate his alternative, though it 
might have the secondary effect of (further) persuading us that understanding cannot 
always be a kind of interpretation. 
Though McDowell wishes to reject the assumption that understanding is always 
interpretation, his alternative account  preserves most of the core premises we have 
seen in the debate—notably, that meaning is normative, and that some form of the 
contractual picture must be able to account for the way that meaning and 
understanding relate normatively to language practice. He aims to respect the first, and 
demonstrate the second. He also aims to preserve the kind of epistemological 
internalism that seems characteristic of the justification debate surrounding Kripke’s 
paradox: he is apparently sympathetic, at least for the sake of argument, to the idea 
that if a particular application of an expression is meaningful and correct then we must 
be able to know that it is both meaningful and correct. I think the supposed plausibility 
of this premise comes from that idea that correct and incorrect language use must be at 
least partly administered (evaluated, encouraged, corrected and so on) by language 
users themselves. The disagreement between realists and anti-realists is about the 
extent of their role as arbiters: anti-realists think that respect for the arbitration of 
language-users is all that the normativity of meaning could amount to, while realists 
would contend that it arises, at least in some cases, out of a need to respect the genuine 
fact that some things just are (in)correct uses of language, whatever we judge. But the 
realists here are not committed to the idea that the facts transcend knowability, or that 
the arbiters’ judgment is somehow an obstacle to the truth. All they have to admit is 
that the arbiters themselves owe allegiance in judgment to facts about the world, and 
accordingly, that their judgments are open not only to peer-review, but to comparison 
with the truth—and importantly, that it is possible for us to know if the judgments are 
false. This is the internalist premise. 
Of course, McDowell does reject the anti-realist’s premise that all kinds of meaning 
must be ‘fully manifest in behaviour’. Recall that this means, roughly, that if something 
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has a meaning then it must be intelligible to someone without presupposing that they 
understand other meaningful utterances, concepts (etc.) in a way that defies analysis in 
non-semantic ‘basic level’ terms.  In fact, McDowell’s aim in the last few sections of 
WFR is apparently to challenge the coherence of this demand, and the possibility of 
explaining meaning in anti-realist terms.  
If McDowell’s alternative account of the contractual picture relies on facts about 
human nature to characterise the formulation of true judgments then McDowell must 
distance his account from Problematic Realism. Indeed, he wants to reject it outright, 
as should be apparent from the mocking tone of his formulation of that idea (cf. my 
§1.2). What McDowell wants is objectivity in correctness without something as strong 
as LI. The idea to be preserved is simply that a judgment about the shape of an object is 
correct or incorrect with reference to the object, and not solely in respect of human 
attitudes (and so on). This seems like a reasonable goal, but the various assumptions 
that frame the debate make this a serious obstacle, and a case must be made for its 
possibility.  
4.2 THE BIG DILEMMA 
McDowell offers a summary of the project he faces in the form of a ‘Scylla and 
Charybdis’ metaphor (WFR 341-2). He claims we are faced with the task of avoiding a 
dilemma, distinct from the Small Dilemma mentioned in §3.2. This new dilemma offers 
us a choice between the assumption that understanding is always interpretation, or the 
conclusion that the ‘basic level’ picture derived from Wright’s account (§2.4) 
represents the way things really are, and (so it is claimed) that language is therefore 
properly understood as meaningless and normativity does not genuinely exist. I will 
call this the ‘Big Dilemma’. 
McDowell claims that the first horn of the Big Dilemma (‘Scylla’), the assumption that 
all understanding is interpretation, leads directly to the Small Dilemma: confront 
Kripke’s sceptical paradox and interpretive regress, or adopt some kind of super-rigid 
account of understanding as interpretation to avoid it. We have seen some evidence to 
support this claim, but it is strictly speaking an open question whether we can take 
understanding to be a kind of interpretation without having to face the Small Dilemma. 
The second horn of the Big Dilemma, McDowell’s ‘Charybdis’, is the account of the basic 
level that Wright is committed to.  McDowell claims that on this account “norms are 
obliterated” (WFR 347) because language practices seem to reduce ontologically to a 
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kind of “brute meaningless sounding off” (WFR 336), a complex but merely causal 
result of the training human beings receive, not sanctioned by any commitments they 
make and thus not subject to correction. The suggestion is that if we embrace the 
second horn “then we cannot prevent meaning from coming to seem an illusion” (WFR 
342). However, there is apparently still scope for making an explanatory reduction of 
language to basic level terms if we reject Wright’s claim that the reduction is 
ontological. 
McDowell’s aim is to reject the first horn without committing us to the second; to reject 
the idea that understanding is always interpretation while also rejecting the idea that 
commitments, meaning and normativity are ontologically reducible to meaningless 
‘basic level’ facts about behaviour. This requires not only a replacement notion of 
understanding, to treat the first horn, but an alternative contractual picture that can 
explain how meaning comes about in a way that does not permit the reduction. The 
account accordingly needs to allow that causal mechanisms like training aim to 
produce certain complex behavioural responses, a neuro-psychological thesis about 
humans which cannot be easily denied, while maintaining that full-fledged language 
practices and the commitments supposedly involved are not ontologically reducible to 
facts about those sorts of things. The real trouble with this is that accepting that the we 
must explain how meaning and normativity arise out of behavioural and psychological 
phenomena seems to commit us, by the (questionable) reasoning of the Illusion 
Argument, to saying that these things are ontologically reducible to behavioural and 
psychological phenomena, because we can give a full characterisation of the former in 
terms of the latter. McDowell will have to maintain that such a characterisation is not 
possible. 
The task is thus to get from the common sense psychological notion that language 
begins with behavioural training guided by correction-behaviour on the part of the 
teacher—indicating to the trainee that his or her actions were incorrect by tone of 
voice, reinforcement of the correct alternative by repetition and so on, comparable to 
the way that one trains a dog—to the idea that the contractual picture involves 
commitments to future use in a way different to the ‘commitments’ an infant makes to 
say ‘mama’ and not ‘dada’ to its mother as a result of a kind of conditioning. What 
needs to be established is that language, commitments and the normativity of meaning 
are only explanatorily reducible to such terms, preserving their genuine existence. 
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If a commitment is different from a disposition, if what I should do is not just an 
unhelpfully complicated way of saying what I and others in the community will do, 
then we should expect to find a clear distinction between the kind of behavioural and 
psychological facts underlying such commitments and the kind of stimulus-response 
behaviour of someone who is psychologically conditioned to respond to certain stimuli 
in certain predictable ways. And yet without any grounding in scientific theories of 
language acquisition, it seems McDowell is not going to be able to lend any support to 
that claim. Furthermore, it is not clear that a scientific theory of the difference would 
really help anyway: it would still talk about psychology or neurology, and not about 
obligations. We would still have an explanation of the behaviour I will exhibit, but not 
prescriptive reason for why I should exhibit it. We might try to provide some 
complicated theory of how communally shared dispositions to undertake certain 
patterns of behaviour are the basis of institutions like ‘commitments’—but then we 
still seem to have accepted the second horn of the Big Dilemma, because commitments 
to calling a spade a spade rely on facts about humans and not facts about the soil-
shifting implement in question and the meaning of the word ‘spade’.32 
Introducing new basic level elements into the picture will not help, and introducing 
supernatural elements is clearly not an option. So how are we going to evade the 
second horn of the Big Dilemma? In fact, this reflection on the idea of facts underlying 
human activities provides a hint to McDowell’s solution to the problem.  As I read him, 
McDowell’s answer takes the form of a thesis about the interrelation of certain kinds of 
ideas, to the effect that while meaning must be analysable in basic level terms, it cannot 
be ontologically reduced to basic level phenomena—precisely the conclusion that is 
required. In a sense, the claim is that the analysis of meaning and understanding in 
behavioural terms provides as full an explanation as is possible of it as a non-
meaningful phenomenon, but in fact the content of that explanation is not to be 
identified with the concept of meaning; something is missing. Accordingly, the absence 
of genuine commitments and normativity from the basic level picture does not entail 
their non-existence, but simply that if they do exist then the basic level picture is an 
incomplete picture of meaning and understanding. This thesis is part of McDowell’s 
alternative gloss on understanding and the contractual picture. 
This thesis involves the strong claim that the explanation of meaning and 
understanding in basic level terms involves an insurmountable obstacle. To support 
this kind of claim, we need to see why the obstacle is insurmountable. The thesis also 
                                                             
32 This is the gist of McDowell’s rejection of Kripke’s ‘sceptical solution’; cf. my §3.1. 
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seems to involve the claim that the relevant notions inherently defy analysis, which 
would need to be argued for if it is meant to be something more than the kind of ad hoc 
irreducibility characteristic of the super-rigid machine idea, the mere stipulation that 
things like commitments and normativity exist in an inherently analysis-defying way. I 
propose these as requirements on an acceptable alternative account. 
4.3 MEANING-PERSPECTIVISM 
McDowell aims to ground his solution to the Big Dilemma in the Wittgenstein-inspired 
thought that “we have to realize that obeying a rule is a practice if we are to find it 
intelligible that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation” (WFR 
339). As opposed to verifying this claim, the immediate challenge is to make sense of it 
in a way that effectively explains why the notion of a practice can help us here. We 
need to see how this idea is relevant. 
Consciously seeking to avoid ad hoc irreducibility, McDowell’s account of 
understanding will incorporate a notion of what we might call ‘non-interpretive 
comprehension’ of an instruction, commitment or prescription. When I commit, on the 
minimal contractual picture, to restricting my usage of an expression to a limited range 
of ways of using it, I act in accordance with this commitment without seeking guidance 
at all. The same applies when I follow an instruction: if I understand it, and am 
committed to acting in a particular way it prescribes, then I follow it as a kind of 
‘second-nature’. So then, 
When I follow a sign-post, the connection between it and my action is 
not mediated by an interpretation of sign-posts that I acquired when I 
was trained in their use. I simply act as I have been trained to. (WFR 
339) 
So the training I have is somehow meant to explain how I can ‘simply act’ in a way that 
counts as following a sign-post. But without further elaboration, it seems like the 
‘training’ in question is just an ad hoc device to bridge the gap between the meaning of 
the sign-post and my understanding it correctly, in precisely the super-rigid manner 
that corresponds to the second horn of the Small Dilemma. This cannot be what 
McDowell means, and we should suspend that concern for the moment. 
A more relevant objection, which McDowell does consider here, is that the training 
merely provides “a causal explanation of certain bits of (what might as well be for all 
that you have said) mere behaviour” (WFR 339). The point seems to be that training 
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someone to respond in certain ways when confronted with sign-posts may cause them 
to do the right thing, but it does not explain why they should do what they do—why the 
‘understanding’ produced by the training is something that commits us to acting in the 
right way, rather than offering a psychological compulsion to act in a way that just 
happens to be what we call ‘right’ most of the time. So for example, I may be 
conditioned to respond to squares with expressions like ‘That is a square’ and not with 
expressions like ‘That is a squirrel’, but the fact that this is what I should do is not what 
motivates me to undertake this course of action—rather, I am compelled by 
engendered desires and attitudes, my neurology and psychology, and so on. It seems I 
could exhibit these reactions without any idea of their meaning. Here it would seem 
that objectivity in facts about the external world would amount to this: that I am 
trained or conditioned to respond to certain stimuli consistently in a particular way, as 
is everyone else, and properties like ‘square-ness’ are ultimately explicable as complex 
descriptions of facts about my behaviour, psychology and the conditioning process, 
and not as properties of the world as it exists independently of me. Accepting that 
training is simply the cause of a complex behavioural effect entails accepting the 
second horn of the Big Dilemma unless we can avoid an ontological reduction here. 
There are no commitments involved in being trained to behave in certain ways—I can 
train myself to drink less coffee, but this is not the same as upholding a commitment to 
drinking less coffee. In a case of mere stimulus-response training, we can only say what 
we expect the subject to do, not what he is committed to doing in the sense of the 
contractual picture—for he is not properly described as committed to anything. We 
could say that he ‘should’ do x, but not in the normative sense of ‘should’—only in the 
sense that my car should start if I turn the ignition key. There are no obligations here. 
The challenge is thus to say how the training McDowell is appealing to can result in 
more than mere behaviour of the stimulus-response kind. It must certainly be 
something more complicated than conditioning or hypnosis, but in the end it seems it 
would have to be a causal process that results in a behavioural output. Where do 
commitments to correct action enter this picture, if not as constructs upon that 
behaviour? 
McDowell’s answer is not particularly illuminating: 
The reply…is that the training in question is initiation into a custom. If 
it were not that, then the account of the connection between sign-post 
and action would indeed look like an account of nothing more than 
brute movement and its causal explanation; our picture would not 
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contain the materials to entitle us to speak of following (going by) a 
sign-post. (WFR 339) 
The claim is that the idea of initiation into a custom, which is conceived of as 
something comparable to a language practice, is what gives us the materials to be able 
to talk about ‘following sign-posts’ rather than behaving in certain complex ways in 
response to stimuli. It is unclear what the significance of this is supposed to be, nor 
how conceiving the training as ‘initiation into a custom’ provides us with any materials 
that we previously lacked. McDowell claims, disappointingly, that this is “only a 
programme for a solution to Wittgenstein’s problem” (WFR 342). However, I have 
suggested (§2.3) McDowell’s best strategy for substantiating his Illusion Argument is 
by showing how the programme might be executed.  
I will now sketch an interpretation and possible development of this reply. As I 
understand it, the point is supposed to be something like this. On McDowell’s account 
‘following a sign-post’ is a distinct concept from ‘behaviour of kind K’, and these 
descriptions attach to different kinds of situations. This, I hope, is relatively 
uncontroversial. The behavioural processes exhibited in someone’s following a sign-
post may be identical to those exhibited in behaviour of kind K. And yet, to an observer 
who is party to the relevant practice—who has learned the concept ‘following a sign 
post’—a distinction can be made between the two. We may observe the same 
behavioural processes, but knowing what it means to follow a sign-post allows us to 
say more than that S is exhibiting behaviour of kind K: we can say that S is following a 
sign post. When we are conducting experiments of a certain kind we may prefer to talk 
about ‘the patterns of behaviour S exhibits’ rather than ‘S’s following a sign-post’. But 
to assume that the behaviour is all that is going on is to neglect the fact that this kind of 
behaviour is called ‘following a sign-post’ by people like us, who are party to the 
relevant language practice of applying the predicate ‘is following a sign-post’. The 
analogy would be that the written word has a meaning for us, and is more than merely 
ink-marks on paper: though of course, on a particular analysis it is simply nothing 
more than such ink-marks. Indeed, on a particular analysis it is not even ink-marks 
that compose the words you are now reading, but sub-atomic particles of all 
varieties—although it would be a strange conflation of levels of analysis to insist that 
these are what you are reading. And this is the sort of point McDowell is making: we 
are observing the behavioural and psychological phenomena we call ‘meaningful 
language use’ and wondering how meaningful language use can be found among these 
meaning-devoid events, wilfully suspending our ordinary inclination to see those 
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events as instances of meaningful language use. The presupposition is that in 
suspending this inclination we will get a better view of what meaning consists in—that 
is the motivation for the anti-realist’s criterion of ‘manifestability’—but it is this very 
disposition to find things meaningful that meaning depends upon. 
On this expansion of McDowell’s programme, the training in question is induction into 
a way of thinking of our surroundings and responding to them, and this is the kind of 
thing meant by ‘custom’ or ‘practice’. Someone who is trained in the use of sign-posts is 
able to conceive behaviour of kind K as ‘following a sign-post’, because has been 
trained to recognise certain complex patterns of behaviour as ‘following a sign-post’. In 
a sense he is conditioned to think this way by the training—but note that the word 
‘conditioning’ implies things like reduced intentionality in actions, and that this is 
unlikely to be how he conceives his own condition, or how we would conceive it having 
undergone the same process. This is how the distinction between basic level terms and 
terms like meaning and normativity can be accounted for without detracting from the 
status of the latter kind as genuine: they are genuine for us. 
If two things are explanatorily reducible to one another, this can sometimes be 
explained by the fact that we conceive the same phenomena presented to us in two 
different ways. An example of two such explanatorily reducible conceptions would be 
a) the spoken claim that snow is white and b) a particular meaning-devoid vocalisation 
made as part of a complex of psychological and behavioural events (etc.). I will call a 
particular conception of things a ‘perspective’, although for the sake of getting an 
outline of the account I will not worry too much about how ‘conceiving of things’ takes 
place—let’s imagine it is something like a way that the thing is presented to me. S ‘has’ 
or ‘occupies’ a particular perspective just in case S has the disposition to conceive 
things in that way. By contrast, one merely ‘consciously adopts’ a particular perspective 
just in case one conceives things in that way deliberately. In addition, if S occupies a 
perspective then it seems to follow that S can consciously adopt that perspective, as in 
the case where S consciously adopts a perspective other than the one S occupies and 
then deliberately returns to the original conception, perhaps by thinking things like “I 
must now conceive of this thing in the original way again”.33 Initiating S into the 
practice of following sign-posts will mean training S to occupy a perspective whereby 
sign-posts are things that can be followed. 
                                                             
33 This raises a number of questions about intentionality that I cannot address here, such as 
whether one can deliberately do something one is already naturally inclined to do, so strictly 
speaking the matter is up for discussion. The example case seems plausible enough, though. 
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What McDowell needs to say is that the perspective of the linguistically competent 
means they are disposed to conceive things like meaningful language use in ‘more-
than-basic-level’ terms, such that when they encounter what might be described as ‘a 
certain pattern of sounds under certain conditions’, they will conceive it as ‘the claim 
that snow is white’. We might say that this is explained by their conditioning to think in 
certain ways, but we could explain it equally well by their understanding of the 
expression ‘snow is white’: the difference is one of perspective. We cannot insist that 
the former provides a ‘more genuine’ picture of the facts without adding additional 
premises to the effect that consciously adopting the perspective from which their 
actions are meaning-devoid provides a more accurate picture. The onus would be on 
us to do so, because we share the perspective of the individual in question, so we too 
are disposed to conceive what might be described as ‘a certain pattern of sounds under 
certain conditions’ as the claim that snow is white. I have used the awkward preface 
‘what might be described as…’ deliberately: an important claim on this account is that 
someone who understands the spoken claim ‘snow is white’ must consciously adopt a 
different perspective on the event in order to conceive it as a pattern of meaning-
devoid behaviour. 
This is ‘meaning-perspectivism’. The account incorporates the following theses 
regarding meaning and understanding: 
(MP1) An expression E is meaningful → there is some perspective 
from which E is meaningful. 
(MP2) S understands the meaning of an expression E → S occupies 
the perspective on E34 required to find E meaningful. 
As this is really just a sketch, I will leave it open whether MP1 allows for the existence 
of perspectives that no-one has.35 Answering that question would mean establishing 
(among other things) whether new perspectives are produced whenever language 
evolves and new meanings are produced.  Note that we talk about perspectives on 
expressions and not on basic level phenomena, the point being that expressions are 
genuinely real phenomena. 
By MP2, if a particular process of training results in S occupying the perspective 
according to which an expression E is meaningful, that training results in S 
                                                             
34 i.e. ‘conception of E’ 
35 It would be an interesting project, sadly also beyond the scope of this thesis, to adapt a kind 
of possible-world semantics in order to express these ideas using a system of modal logic. 
Opening up that kind of precise analysis might help highlight improvements that could be made 
to meaning-perspectivism. 
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understanding the meaning of E. How does this sit with the minimal contractual 
picture (C+M2-4)? 
If meaning-perspectivism is consistent with principle C then MP2 can express at most a 
necessary condition for understanding the meaning of E. Occupying the relevant 
perspective on E could only be a sufficient condition for understanding the meaning of 
E if doing so entails undertaking to use E only in a range of ways R, or if C is false. We 
might be inclined to take the latter option and reject the minimal contractual picture—
but that cannot be McDowell's choice because he is committed to C. 
I suggest McDowell should try to make commitments a consequence of adopting the 
relevant perspective on E by considering things as perceived by an occupant of that 
perspective. What needs to be said is that when S is trained in the meaning of E, from 
S’s perspective it is not the case that S is being conditioned in order to cultivate the 
disposition to conceive certain meaning-devoid phenomena as meaningful, but rather, 
that S is being taught the correct use of E. Saying this would allow room for the 
normativist’s  intuition that understanding the correct use of E entails something 
prescriptive, and for the subsequent analysis of that prescription in ‘contractual terms’. 
The idea is to reconcile the dispositional aspect of understanding the meaning of an 
expression, that training of a brute causal kind is certainly involved in the acquisition 
of that understanding, with the normative aspect, that one recognises certain uses of 
the expression as correct and that correctness is prescriptive. As before, it is supposed 
to be an easy move from the prescription of correct use to the idea of a commitment to 
restricting one’s use to a certain range, and any potential problems with that will be 
identical to those we saw in §1.1. 
This option seems open to McDowell, but the enabling claim that S conceives his 
training in terms of correct use will ultimately require an extended exposition and 
defence that I cannot offer here. The same will apply, of course, to the notion of a 
‘perspective’. In any case, our concern should be to see how this rough form of 
meaning-perspectivism might deal with the Big Dilemma on the assumption that MP2 
and C are consistent, in order to assess whether proof of this would be worth pursuing 
by the requirements of McDowell’s task. 
The meaning-perspectivist gloss on the contractual picture would seem to be C+M1-
4+MP1-2, but M1-4 will have to take on very different meanings in this context. What 
we cannot allow here is that the range R of correct ways of using an expression E that S 
commits to in understanding the meaning of E is some kind of mental list of ways of 
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using E—that would bring back all the problems associated with the interpretation 
model of understanding, and would seem unnecessary given our notion of causal 
behavioural training as underlying recognition of correctness. Perhaps we could allow 
that the training furnishes S with some kind of tacit knowledge of R, such that S 
recognises an application of E as correct just in case E is located in R. Such details 
would need to be elaborated in a properly formulated exposition of meaning-
perspectivism 
4.4 DODGING THE BIG DILEMMA 
If S understands the meaning of E then S occupies the perspective from which E has 
that meaning, and from which certain actions are conceived entirely in terms of their 
being correct of incorrect applications of E. S is thus able to apply E correctly without 
interpreting the range of actions prescribed by his understanding of the meaning of E, 
because actions in that range are not conceived in terms of meaningless behaviour but 
simply as correct uses of E. Nothing requires interpretation because the uninterpreted 
materials in question, the potential behavioural patterns we would have otherwise had 
to assess against the range of behavioural patterns that count as correct use of E, are 
not ‘bare’ to us here at all. Someone who occupies the relevant perspective does not 
need to interpret the meaning of an expression any more than I must interpret the 
sensory information conveyed by my eyes to my brain. Taking the analogy further, the 
perspective in question is also not the sort of thing we could have ‘interpreted’ anyway. 
The process of understanding the meaning here is, if you like, ‘passive’. 
This indicates the possibility of avoiding the first horn of the Big Dilemma. We do not 
see uses of the expression as meaning-devoid behaviour, but as correct or incorrect 
actions, and we do not need to ‘interpret’ our understanding to check this. The problem 
with the ‘understanding as interpretation’ model is that it assumes, for example, that in 
understanding spoken language I am presented with patterns of meaningless vocal 
behaviour which I must interpret by consciously engaging with some mental object in 
the right way; or at least, that my understanding implies there is such an object with 
which I could have engaged. The paradox arises because we also imagine that the 
mental object in question is an item of no immediate significance to us—as indeed we 
must, if we assume that understanding it would mean interpreting it. I know that what 
I do is correct because I have been trained to think things like ‘this action is correct’ in 
response to such actions, or more likely, to prefer it when the expression is used in this 
kind of way—that I now think this way is my justification for claiming to mean one 
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thing rather than another. Even this is not quite right though: the justification I would 
offer, from my perspective, is simply that I understand and know how to use the word.  
The crucial point is that from my perspective the training was not the cultivation of 
dispositions to respond to certain stimuli in certain ways, but training in the 
recognition of correct actions. Expecting to find facts about correctness outside of a 
language-user’s perspective will be futile, if the difference between whether something 
is meaning-devoid behaviour or correct action depends entirely on adoption of that 
perspective. And this is precisely what I think McDowell wishes to claim. 
In light of this, the Big Dilemma seems to be generated by the assumption that we must 
be able to explain the coherence of our language practices without taking any language 
practices for granted—crucially denying ourselves the appeal to our engendered 
inclination to see ‘basic-level’ phenomena as meaningful. The ‘engendered inclination’ 
here, what I have been calling a perspective we occupy, is something like what 
McDowell calls “bedrock…where justifications have come to an end” (WFR 341). The 
idea is that, as competent language users, we see meaning in the world without having 
to look for it or check what it is. The Big Dilemma is apparently a result of an attempt 
to step outside our language practice and observe goings-on without getting involved 
in things like meaningful behaviour ourselves—but of course, any kind of analysis will 
require full use of our linguistic capacities, so the task is impossible. 
The misguided project is motivated by the thought that there must be some fact about 
what happens from an extra-linguistic perspective, and that this would be the genuine 
fact of the matter, so we must try and characterise what that fact would be like. That 
conception of objective facts is characteristic of Problematic Realism—but it is also this 
kind of fact that anti-realists try to get hold of when insisting on the full behavioural 
manifestability of concepts. What both have in common is an attempt to explain things 
as they seem from our perspective, from a different perspective. 
The problem might be brought out as follows. According to meaning-perspectivism, 
when someone plays a game of chess he partakes in a practice that has very clear rules, 
and failing to respect them will result in his being disqualified or otherwise penalised. 
When he plays the game properly, he respects the rules: but there is no separate action 
he undertakes of ‘playing by the rules’ as opposed to ‘playing chess’. On the anti-realist 
model, we look at the actions he performs and conclude that we have come to agree 
that these actions are called legal moves in chess, but that the actions themselves are 
just as fairly construed as meaningless.  
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However, within the context of chess—the actual context of what is going on here—it 
is simply untrue that the actions are meaningless. ‘Moving a little piece of varnished, 
lathed wood away from oneself from a white-painted square to a black-painted 
square…’ and so on, is not the same as ‘conducting a King’s Pawn opening’, which 
would be described in terms of White’s first move, that the pawn rather than a knight 
is moved, and with respect to other chess terminology. However complex the 
behavioural description, if the actions are placed outside the context of a game of chess 
then we cannot expect to introduce chess terminology into the picture, even though 
someone who knows enough about chess will recognise that they correspond to the 
action called a King’s Pawn opening. 
So how do we place these complex behavioural actions in the context of a game of 
chess, if the actions themselves do not require alteration? McDowell’s answer is that 
one must be party to the relevant practice, that of playing chess (or perhaps watching 
or judging games of chess).  According to meaning-perspectivism, the actions take on 
this character not because the movements in question are different, but because they 
correspond to a move in a chess game from the perspective of someone who has been 
initiated into the practice of playing chess by means of the relevant training. The 
actions become moves in the game for us because we are trained to perceive them as 
such. This ability should, of course, be understood as the product of a kind of training 
in complex behavioural responses. But to identify the practice with behavioural 
responses of this kind is to fail to respect the fact that within the context of ‘playing 
chess’, we are no longer dealing with mere behaviour—and the context is established 
by means of a particular perspective. 
The anti-realist wants to say that the game of chess is reducible to certain kinds of 
behaviour, and of course it can be analysed as such —but in undertaking that analysis 
we have stopped talking about chess. To call this an explanatory reduction is 
misleading because there is no identity between the two phenomena ‘behaving in this 
complex way’ and ‘playing chess’: perhaps there is some transcendent ‘thing’ they both 
correspond to when ‘viewed without any kind of perspective’, but that is certainly not 
what is meant by the claim that they are identical. The one is a complex analysis of the 
behaviour characteristic of the other, but it will be an incomplete characterisation of 
‘playing chess’ so long as we neglect to include the point that one must be trained to 
adopt a particular perspective in order to get those concepts. And even including 
mention of this point precludes us from characterising ‘playing chess’ in a way that 
would be ‘fully manifest in behaviour’, because ‘playing chess’ will be manifest to an 
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observer who is not equipped to adopt that perspective. This means denying the 
legitimacy of the anti-realist’s requirement that grasp of concepts be manifestable in 
this way. 
According to meaning-perspectivism, searching for the action ‘following the rules’ 
alongside the action ‘behaving in this complex way’ is misguided in the same way that 
looking for an extra activity ‘running quickly’ alongside the activity ‘running’ is 
misguided. The two things happen concurrently, separable only with reference to two 
distinct perspectives on the action. The anti-realist strategy effectively commits us to 
imagining that we do not understand things we actually do understand, and trying to 
explain them without being privy to the understanding required in order to deploy the 
relevant concepts. Having depriving ourselves of the tools required, the endeavour is 
hopeless—but why should this surprise us? No one is expecting a cell biologist to find 
the phenomenon ‘King’s pawn opening’ in his enquiries, because that is not the way 
that a cell biologist conceives of cell activity. This idea goes some way towards 
explaining why the characterisation of meaningful language use in basic level terms 
presents an insurmountable obstacle to finding meaning in actions: the picture is 
incomplete unless we already benefit from mastery of the practice in question, and 
thus, from the requisite perspective on those actions. 
4.5 CONCLUSION  
The sketch of meaning-perspectivism offered here does not go too far beyond what 
McDowell offers in WFR, and the most significant additions pertain to exploring what 
could be meant by the idea that training in the use of an expression is induction into a 
‘custom, practice or institution’. This is where the notion of ‘perspective’ came from, 
but there are plenty of other glosses on that central idea in the rule-following literature 
that practices are the solution to problems like Kripke’s sceptical paradox, so I have no 
illusions that McDowell must be committed to meaning-perspectivism. 
What is noticeable is that the Big Dilemma is quite well accounted for on this sketch, 
and all we really needed to acknowledge to avoid it was that language users are simply 
trained to apply their language to the world, and that a product of this training is that 
things are simply meaningful to them. This might seem slightly anti-climactic, but the 
valuable lesson here is that it is only possible to conduct a philosophical analysis of 
language if one has been trained in the language in question. Contrary to McDowell’s 
ineffective Illusion Argument, though, the fact that the training is about forming 
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psychological and behavioural dispositions to which language can be explanatorily 
reduced does not make language meaningless.  
McDowell aims, like his anti-realist counterparts, to reject Problematic Realism. In the 
account sketched above this translated as the idea that genuine facts are facts that rely 
on no particular perspective on things. The appropriate response, I suggest, is to accept 
that perspectives are necessary, but Wright takes this a step too far when he identifies 
correctness with consensus. As I have repeatedly emphasised, the fact that all human 
judgments are couched in acceptable use of language does not mean that our ordinary 
conception of objectivity requires revision. Wright’s disastrous acceptance of CO 
illustrates this point very well. 
I have consciously conducted this analysis in the controversial frame of the assumption 
that meaning is normative, a thesis that has come under fire in recent years. However, 
it seems to me that if there is any scope for defending and developing meaning-
perspectivism then there might also be scope for preserving the thesis that meaning if 
normative. Glüer and Wikforss suggest that the normativity of meaning was supposed 
to be “a pre-theoretical requirement that any plausible theory of meaning has to 
respect” (2009, p.34), and I am interested by the prospect that meaning-perspectivism 
might lend substance to that claim without explicitly adopting the thesis that meaning 
is normative. If the training required to adopt a perspective on some expression had 
the effect of making us prefer correct application of it to incorrect application, then 
from within that perspective there might be scope for seeing correct applications as 
the ones we should make. That is a tantalising possibility indeed. 
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QUICK-REFERENCE GLOSSARY 
I have labelled a large number of ‘theses’ in the text and refer back to them by label. 
The important ones are reproduced here for ease of reference. 
(C) S understands the meaning of E → S undertakes to use E only in a 
range of ways R whenever S uses E. 
(M1) For any possible application a of an expression E, a is either 
objectively correct or objectively incorrect, and for any 
understanding of the meaning of E, a is either correct or incorrect 
relative to that understanding. 36 
(M2) S’s understanding of the meaning of E is proper ↔ S undertakes to 
apply E only in a range of ways R, where R is the range of correct 
ways of applying E. 
(M3) S’s understanding of the meaning of E is faulty ↔ S undertakes to 
apply E only in a range of ways R*, where R* is not the range of 
correct ways of applying E. 
(M4) S undertakes to apply E only in a range of ways R → S can 
accidentally apply E in a way falling outside R. 
(W1) For any application a of an expression E, a is either correct or 
incorrect ↔ a is an actual (not merely possible) application of E. 
(CO) (It is the majority view that P) ↔ P 
(MP1) An expression E is meaningful → there is some perspective from 
which E is meaningful. 
(MP2) S understands the meaning of an expression E → S occupies the 
perspective on E37 required to find E meaningful. 
Logical Independence (LI) For particular true statements it is either 
unnecessary or insufficient, or both, to meet our 
most refined criteria of acceptability in order to 
be true. (W, p.199) 
Minimal Contractual Picture Understanding the meaning of an expression 
imposes some kind of constraints on one’s 
future actions, amounting to a commitment to 
make only a certain kind of use of the 
expression. 
                                                             
36 This is the refined version of M1 from the end of §1.3. 
37 i.e. ‘conception of E’ 
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Problematic Realism A genuine fact must be a matter of the way 
things are in themselves, utterly independently 
of us. So a genuinely true judgment must be, at 
least potentially, an exercise of pure thought; if 
human nature is necessarily implicated in the 
very formulation of the judgment, that precludes 
our thinking of the corresponding fact as 
properly independent of us, and hence as a 
proper fact at all. (WFR 351) 
  
 
